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Abstract 
Spam is becoming a more and more severe problem for individuals, networks, 
organisations and businesses. The losses caused by spam are billions of dollars every 
year. Research shows that spam contributes more than 80% of e-mails with an increased 
in its growth rate every year. Spam is not limited to emails; it has started affecting other 
technologies like VoIP, cellular and traditional telephony, and instant messaging services. 
None of the approaches (including legislative, collaborative, social awareness and 
technological) separately or in combination with other approaches, can prevent sufficient 
of the spam to be deemed a solution to the spam problem. 
The severity of the spam problem and the limitations of the state-of-the-Art solutions 
create a strong need for an efficient anti-spam mechanism that can prevent significant 
volumes of spam without showing any false positives. This can be achieved by an 
efficient anti-spam mechanism such as the proposed anti-sparn mechanism known as 
"Sparn Prevention using Access Codes", SP AC. SP AC targets spam from two angles i.e. 
to preventlblock sparn and to discourage spammers by making the infrastructure 
environment very unpleasant for them. 
In addition to the idea of Access Codes, SPAC combines the ideas behind some of the 
key current technological anti-spam measures to increase effectiveness. The difference in 
this work is that SPAC uses those ideas effectively and combines them in a unique way 
which enables SPAC to acquire the good features of a number of technological anti-spam 
approaches without showing any of the drawbacks of these approaches. Sybil attacks, 
Dictionary attacks and address spoofing have no impact on the performance of SPAC. In 
fact SP AC functions in a similar way (i.e. as for unknown persons) for these sorts of 
attacks. 
An application known as the "SP AC application" has been developed to test the 
performance of the SP AC mechanism. The results obtained from various tests on the 
SPAC application show that SPAC has a clear edge over the existing anti-spam 
technological approaches. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is about the prevention of spam in emails and spam in Voice over IP (VoIP) 
also referred to as SPIT (Spam over Internet Telephony). There are other types of spam 
as well which are related to short messaging service (SMS), Instant Messaging (IM), 
blogs etc. This thesis considers two fOTIns of spam in a single research solution (i.e. spam 
in email and spam in VoIP). The thesis proposes a mechanism called SPAC (Spam 
Prevention using Access Codes) for prevention of email spam and SPIT. However, SPAC 
can be applied to prevent other fOTIns of spam as well. To avoid the complexity, however 
this thesis limits itself to only spam email and SPIT. In the following paragraphs, the 
importance of network communication is discussed followed by network security issues 
and threats with particular focus on spam. The last sections discuss the research problem, 
question and contribution of the thesis. 
1.2 Importance of Network Communication 
. The Internet is an essential part of our life. Network communication is affecting the way 
we live. These days Internet is being used as an essential part in every field of life e.g. 
surveys, research, innovations, businesses, education, government, updating individuals 
and tackling emergencies to name a few. However, the open access of the Internet opens 
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users, companies and organisations to malicious threats and attacks which threaten the 
confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of their valuable data and resources [I]. 
1.3 Security 
There is a range of product services and data resources that the Internet offers. As the 
world becomes more firmly interconnected, the need for improving network security 
increases. Not only are the financial effects of loss greater than ever, systems are now 
more exposed to a wider variety of threats and in particular to risks caused by the greater 
access to systems offered by the Internet. The fast expansion in communication areas and 
the failure of current network architectures to deliver the desired security and privacy 
increase the need to research and embed security into the network architecture [2]. The 
number of books and research in network security is increasing as are the number of 
attacks on networks. 
The data on which businesses depend comprises vital private and business assets. This 
includes personal, financial information, business secrets, business strategies, innovative 
ideas, designs, orders and plans. Loss through malicious attack or an accident could have 
severe business and financial consequences. A lack of public trust in a business's privacy, 
confidentiality, and integrity levels may lead to loss of customers and eventually can 
threaten the survival of an organisation/company. 
Network security concerns are of two types [2]: 
• Network infrastructure security 
• Content security 
1.3.1 Network Infrastrncture security 
Network infrastructure security comprises securing of the physical devices that provide 
network connectivity and prevent unauthorized access to the management software and 
applications that reside on them. 
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1.3.2 Content security 
Content security involves protecting information. This information may be in the form of 
packets being transmitted over the network or it may be stored on network attached 
devices. To secure the contents during transmission, different tools must be implemented 
on top of the underlying protocols which manage how packets are formatted, addressed 
and delivered. In addition security tools and protocols should be employed on the end 
systems as well. 
1.4 Techniques used by attackers 
In order to achieve their objectives, attackers normally create malicious programs and 
. methods. Essential information in a computer network may also be collected before 
launching an attack. The following two methods are normally used in information 
gathering: 
• Port Scanning: A port scanner program is used by an attacker to automatically 
detect any open port in a remote system. This enables him to take control of the 
machine. Its analogy is a thief looking for an unlocked door or window ·of a 
house. Scanners are normally TCP port scanners that attack TCP/IP ports and 
services (Telnet or FTP, for example), and record the response from the target. 
• Packet SnijJing: A packet sniffer is software that captures 'packets' travelling 
across a network. By looking into the contents of the packets, hackers try to 
achieve valuable information like usemames, passwords, addresses, card numbers 
or the contents of e-mails. 
1.5 The CIA triad 
In this section we discuss a few topics related to security and the main threats to network 
security. The three key aspects of information security are referred to as the CIA triad: 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Some additional aspects of security e.g., non-
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repudiation or accounting have not been included in the CIA triad. In short we can say 
that network security provides four services: confidentiality (privacy), integrity, 
availability and non-repudiation [3]. 
1.5.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality means that the transmitted message/information must not be revealed to 
unauthorized persons or subjects. It must make sense only to the intended and authorized 
recipients. These recipients may be individuals, processes or devices. The data must be 
unintelligible to all others. Physical protection and encryption is normally used to ensure 
the privacy of a message. Strong user authentication systems and difficult to guess 
passwords help restrict access to unauthorised communications and data. 
1.5.2 Integrity 
Integrity has been categorised into two categories: (1) data integrity and (2) source 
integrity. Data integrity is maintained by not allowing any changes in the data (either 
accidental or malicious) throughout its transmission, from origin to destination. Data 
integrity certifies that the information has not been corrupted (intentionally or 
unintentionally) before its reception by the intended recipient. Source integrity means that 
a pretender (imposter) has not sent the message. The receiver needs to confirm the 
sender's identity. Digital signatures can give message integrity in a secure 
communication. 
1.5.3 Availability 
Availability promises that the services are available and accessible (at a rate fast enough 
for a system to perform its tasks) when needed by legitimate users. In the absence of 
service availability confidentiality and integrity are irrelevant. Service availability attacks 
have direct impacts on businesses and customers. In addition to the opportunity cost 
related to service unavailability, it results in loss of revenue and profit, system downtime 
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and loss of productivity. Due to these reasons service availability attacks are considered 
as the most damaging to networks. A Denial of Service (DoS) attack or the spread of a 
computer virus can cause service unavailability. 
1.5.4 Non-repUdiation 
It means that a receiver must be able to prove the true sender of a received message. In 
other words the sender must not be able to deny sending a message that he/she did send. 
Digital signature can provide non-repudiation. 
1.6 Network Threats and Attacks 
Threat and vulnerability are used interchangeably for issues related to network security. 
However there is a difference between the terms threat, attack, and vulnerability [4]. 
According to Webster's dictionary threat is defined as, "The expression of an intention to 
inflict evil or injury on another; the declaration of an evil, loss, or pain to come." The 
actual attempt to impact the network and its assets is referred to as attack. Vulnerability is 
defined by (Request for Comments) RFC 3067 [5] as, "A flaw or weakness in a system's 
design, implementation, or operation and management that could be exploited to violate 
the system's security policy." In this section we discuss some common network threats 
which are encountered on the Internet for almost any application including VoIP. 
1.6.1 Denial of Service (DoS) 
The purpose of a denial of service attack (DOS) is the unavailability of the services of the 
targeted machine (host, switch, router, server etc) or application. In such an attack, the 
under attacked machine ceases or slows down its operation due to lack of allocated 
resources (memory, processing or communication) or by a system crash. These attacks 
are the most harmful to networks due to its direct impacts to business resulting in loss of 
customers, revenue and profit, system downtime and loss of productivity. Services like E-
911 (Emergency Response Service 911 on VoIP), are susceptible to such attacks and can 
result in catastrophic damage. Encryption and firewall can protect VoIP networks, but 
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they also introduce significant delay. Above all due to the VoIP's real-time nature, data is 
never stored in a VoIP scenario and any packet loss is not retransmitted like ordinary data 
networks. Due to the small size of voice packets in voice networks loss of some packets 
doesn't affect the voice transmission. "Packet losses as low as one percent can make a 
call unintelligible, depending on the compression scheme used. A five percent loss is 
catastrophic, no matter how good the codec" [6]. It means that VoIP networks can easily 
be targeted by computer worms because the loss of bandwidth could knock out the 
network. There are two main classes of DoS attacks: flooding and exploitation [7] 
DoS Flooding Attacks 
In this attack large volumes of traffic are targeted at a system to exhaust its resources like 
bandwidth, CPU processing, memory or even storage. The flow of traffic exceeds the 
capacity of the host, server, application or circuit and exceeds the resource's capacity to 
operate. "A DoS flooding attack can be directed at different levels of the TCP/IP protocol 
stack" [7]. 
Exploitation DoS 
Here the attacker discovers some implementation flaw which can cause a target to fail. As 
a result of a successful attack the targeted resource is incapable to offer services. 
Attackers commonly abuse URL encoding in HTTP or HTTPS requests. By doing so the 
attackers force a web application into doing something the designers didn't predict. 
Exploitation attacks are also known as implementation DoS attacks [7]. These attacks are 
not limited to web applications. "An attacker can send malformed SIP, H.323 and RTP 
packets to VoIP servers to exploit protocol implementation vulnerability, force a failure 
condition, and ideally, "get root" privileges (e.g. system administrator level access)" [7]. 
1.6.2 Distributive Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks 
In a DDoS attack, a huge number of compromised systems attack a single target. An 
attacker delivers virus or worm to a large number of hosts and installs a Trojan program 
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on these hosts. This gives him control of these hosts. The attacker then uses the resources 
of all these hosts and targets a system. The flood of incoming messages from the 
compromised systems causes denial of service for users of the targeted system. The 
attacker exploits vulnerability in one computer system and makes it the DDoS "master". 
The master program then directs Trojan programs (referred to as zombies) or multiple 
compromised systems. In this way, the attacker uses the resources of all these 
compromised systems and instructs all the machines to concurrently launch an attack 
against a target. Apart from the focus on the targeted host there are many victims (the 
compromised systems) in a DDoS attack. 
1.6.3 Man-in-the-Middle 
In this attack, the attacker can examine and capture messages between the two hosts by 
inserting himself in between them. In a successful attack, the attacker is able to read, 
introduce and change messages between the two hosts. In addition to that the attacker can 
also prevent the packets destined for a recipient. MITM attack may include 
eavesdropping, replay attacks, phishing etc. "MITM is typically used to refer to active 
manipulation of the messages, rather than passively eavesdropping" [8]. 
In such an attack the attacker either impersonates (pretending to be the authorised user) or 
spoofs the address of a legitimate client [8]. The attack can be executed at many levels of 
the TCP/IP architecture. It can also be executed at the application layer [7]. 
1.6.4 Theft of service 
In theft of service attacks, the attacker obtains valuable services without paying for them. 
This is achieved by illegal means such as by stealing shared secret keys, private keys or 
the credentials of some legitimate client. A redirection attack is one of the worst cases of 
theft of service. In such an attack the service or contents (e.g. a voice message) requested 
by an authorized host or party can be redirected to an unauthorized host. 
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1.6.5 Eavesdropping 
As we discussed, privacy and confidentiality are the key aspects of security. 
Eavesdropping is actually the attempt to collect information or in other words to leak out 
privacy and confidentiality. In such an attack the attacker copies or listens to 
communication between the two hosts. It can be passive (i.e, collect, store and analyse 
the data) or active (i.e. decodingltranslation of packets). As a result of a successful attack, 
an eavesdropper can discover credentials, calling pattems or other sensitive information. 
The captured data (audio, video, or text messaging) can be replayed or rebroadcast. [7] 
1.6.6 Impersonation 
Here an attacker pretends to be another user or host, especially one that the intended 
victim trusts. For example, in phishing attacks [9] an attacker sends an email to a user and 
pretends to be from a trust worthy organisation (like bank, university etc). In such attacks, 
the attacker also directs the user to his own web site instead of the user's online banking 
site. The misleading web site is very similar to the user's actual online banking site. If the 
victim fall a prey then the attacker gets his banking andlor his other sensitive information. 
"Address spoofing is a common form of impersonation attack" [7]. 
1.6.7 SPAM 
Unsolicited bulk messages are informally known as spam. Spam is one of the biggest 
threats to the intemet and it costs billions of dollars every year. The impacts of spam 
range from loss of productivity to theft of personal information, legal and social issues to 
exploitation of the precious Internet and computer resources. One of the main reasons of 
sending spam is that it is extremely cheap for a spannner. Network maintainers, recipients 
(legitimate customers, companies/organisations etc) have to pay the costs of spamming. 
There is no state-of-art mechanism which can prevent sufficient spam and proves to be a 
magic bullet for the spam problem. This research focuses on spam prevention. Spam is 
discussed in detail in the next chapter with particular focus on the problems/losses caused 
by it. The inefficiency of the existing anti-spam techniques, the extent of the losses 
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caused by spam and high demand for an anti-spam mechanism provides motivation for 
research in this area. 
1.7 Research Problem 
Most of the Internet users receive unwanted messages in the fOITn advertisements, 
winning notifications, fraudulent emails and malicious executable codes. The Internet 
resources are badly exploited by spammers for the distribution of information and for 
achieving financial gains. The problem is that we cannot differentiate (with full 
confidence) between a spammer and a legitimate client based on the contents of a header 
or a message. This is due to the anonymity that is inherent to the email and VoIP 
infrastructure. The spammer always pretends to be a legitimate client. Above all the 
spammers spoof addresses and pes of innocent remote users can be easily controlled to 
fulfil the job of a sparnmer by sending auto-generated messages (bots). Various 
mechanisms have been proposed for spam prevention but all of these methods have a 
number of limitations with the likelihood of false positives and false negatives. Spam 
causes many problems including employee productivity loss, expenses on anti-spam 
measures and IT staff, exposure to viruses, spyware, adware, loss of corporate assets, 
misuse of network resources etc. The total world wide financial losses caused by spam 
are estimated at several billion USD per year [10] and [11]. This scenario forced the 
related authorities to combat spam with a number of approaches including legislative and 
technological solutions to name a few. As far as the legislative approaches are concerned 
so far they have shown very limited effectiveness due to the problem that the sparnmers 
spoof addresses of innocent users and senders of spam can not be traced back with 
sufficient reliability. In addition, state-of-the-art anti-spam technological measures have a 
number of limitations and negative impacts on the distribution oflegitimate messages. As 
discussed in [12], the current filtering mechanisms are heuristic approaches, even with 
the best filters that are the most deployed type of technological anti-spam measures, these 
anti-spam measures sometimes misclassify legitimate email as spam. Another problem is 
that with the state-of-the-art anti-spam measures, the legitimate users of the Internet or 
Network have to pay the cost of fighting spam as these measures allocate the resources of 
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the recipients of emails. In cases like VoIP where we deal with real-time audio, the 
problem becomes even more severe because filtering and/or other security processes can 
affect the voice quality. Because of this reason most of the techniques that work (up to 
some extent) for spam prevention, fail completely in the scenario of SPIT (so called spam 
over internet telephony, SPIT). 
1.8 Research Questions 
In order to solve the above research problem, the research needs to answer the following 
research questions: 
• How to develop a mechanism which can filter messages of spamrners from 
those ofIegitimate clients? 
• How to design a mechanism which is equally efficient for preventing text 
spam messages (emaiI) and for preventing SPIT (Spam over Internet 
Telephony)? 
• How to develop a mechanism which has no negative impacts of the state-of-
the-art techniques (especially of false positive, false negative and 
inconvenience)? 
• How to develop an infrastructure so unpleasant for the spammer that he gives 
up and goes away? 
1.9 Contributions 
1. The major contribution of the thesis is that it provides an anti-spam mechanism which 
prevents uses Access Codes to prevent the different spam attacks including spoofing 
attacks, sybil attacks (attacks in which the spammers change their identity or make 
new accounts), dictionary attacks, auto-spam (bots) etc. 
2. The second contribution of the thesis is that it provides an integrated framework by 
combining a number of existing anti-spam techniques to achieve better results. This is 
done with the use of Access Codes. 
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3. The third contribution of the thesis is related to the unique feature of SPAG which 
does not show any false positive. As discussed in section 3.5.8, the existing 
approaches for preventing sparn come with a likelihood of false positive and false 
negative. The results shown in chapter 6 shows that there are no false positive related 
to SPAC 
4. The fourth contribution of the thesis is in developing a mechanism which is effective 
for preventing SPIT (sparn over internet telephony) without affecting the voice 
quality. The reason is that the sparnmers are filtered out in the connection 
establishment phase. Current state-of-the-art anti-spam techniques fail in the scenario 
of VolP or they provide inconvenience specially related to the Quality of Service 
(QoS) which is not acceptable in VoIP. 
5. This work proposes a mechanism which considers not only sparn email but also spam 
in VoIP referred to as SPIT. Sparn email and spit have the same goals. However, the 
technical differences in these different forms of sparn make the problem of spam too 
complex if it is considered in general in a single overview [13]. The mechanism 
proposed (SPAC) in this thesis is applicable for preventing spam in its different forms 
(such as spam email, SPIT). 
6. SPAC takes into account the effectiveness from the user perspective but also takes 
into account the prevention of the consumption of precious Internet resources which 
is not possible with the existing content filtering techniques. As mentioned by Enrico 
Blanzieri and Anton Bryl [13], filtering on the destination point solves the problems 
caused by spam only partially. This prevents end-users from wasting their time on 
junk messages but since all the messages are delivered nevertheless, this mechanism 
does not prevent resource misuse. In addition existing content filtering mechanisms 
do a lot of processing on the contents of the message. This uses the network resources 
and adds to the carbon foot print of IT. Above all the network gets congested due to 
the huge amount of spam data. As opposed to this mechanism, SP AC does not allow 
sparn traffic (data) to use the network resources. In fact a sparnmer, (who is not and 
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who can not be in the Trusted Persons List, TPL list discussed later) can not get even 
a connection which is required before sending the data. So, the spam traffic (data) 
does not access the network which saves internet resources in addition to preventing 
end users from the nuisance of spam. 
7. The SPAC mechanism provides an alternative solution for the problems caused by the 
lack of technical definition of spam as discussed in section 3.5.8. Messages related to 
jokes, legitimate marketing or political messages might be spam for most of us but 
many would still like to receive them. This problem can not be solved by existing 
spam filters. SPAC solves this problem by providing a SPAC enable and SPAC 
disable feature as discussed in chapter 6 (section 5.3.2). Also as discussed by Andy 
Walker [14] in the existing mechanisms, during registration, if a user agrees to 
receive email from an organisation (opt-in) then the email that the organisation sends 
is not considered as spam. This happens with a lot of users. In order to stop such 
emails the user needs to go back to the company's website and find out how to opt-
out (unsubscribe). Most reputable companies have a mechanism for unsubscribing but 
not every company does have. It means that the control is with the company. A 
similar incident was mentioned by Andy Walker [14] in his book where he mentions, 
"Out of curiosity, I bought a list of 10 million Canadian email addresses for $49. The 
company claimed they were all opt-in ernail addresses, meaning that the owners of 
the addresses had agreed to be put on the list. I found one of my addresses that was 
used for inbound mail only, however. It was never used to opt into anything". The 
author didn't opt-in for the emails but the company claimed that all these users 
including the author did. SP AC gives this control to the user. At the same time to 
know about the mechanism of unsubscribing is difficult because it is different for 
each company. This also adds to the inconvenience of the existing mechanism. As 
discussed in section 5.3.2, instead of going through the opt-out mechanism of each 
company individually, a SP AC user can enable or disable such messages (from all the 
companies) with a single setting in his own account. 
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8. Since SPAC prevents spam on the connection establishment phase so it can prevent 
spam in various forms (such as voice, audio, text and image) without affecting their 
quality. This means that SPAC can be applied to a number of other technologies such 
as cellular telephony, traditional telephony and instant messaging service. 
9. SP AC targets spam from two angles i.e. to preventlblock spam and to discourage 
spammers by making the infrastructure environment very unpleasant for them. 
1.10 Thesis Overview 
The thesis is organized in the following way: 
Chapter I (this chapter) gives an insight into the research work. It discusses the 
importance of network communication and the network security threats and issues. It also 
discusses the research problem, the questions to be addressed by the thesis and the 
contribution of the thesis. • 
Chapter 2 is dedicated to spam. It reviews the definition, history, aims and 
problems caused by spam. This chapter also introduces spam in VoIP (referred to as 
SPIT). The differences between spam email and SPIT is also presented in this chapter. 
The chapter reveals that spam is a major threat to the most attractive applications of 
Internet like email and VoIP and expresses the extreme need for an anti-spam solution. 
Chapter 3 explores the state-of-the-art approaches for preventing spam. The 
chapter discusses the legislative, social, collaborative and technological anti-spam 
approaches and shows the inefficiency of these state-of-the-art approaches and 
legislations. The outcomes of the detailed discussion in this chapter generate a number of 
research questions and areas which need to be addressed in the war against spam. 
Chapter 4 of the thesis proposes a novel anti-spam mechanism which is called 
"Spam Prevention using Access Code", SP AC. The chapter discusses the detailed 
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working of the mechanism and analyses the system in different case studies. The last 
section of the chapter is a brief glance on the novelty verification of the mechanism. 
Chapter 5 overviews the SP AC application which has been used to perform 
different tests and experiments. It shows how to· use the SP AC application and gives 
results and screen shots of some practical experiments. 
Chapter 6 provides the different results obtained from different tests and 
experiments. 
Chapter 7 compares the performance of SP AC with state-of-the-art mechanisms 
and mentions the other areas of its applications. 
Chapter 8 summarises the conclusion and gives a glance of the future research 
work. 
1.11 Summary 
Network communications are an integral part of our daily routines and affect the way we 
live. The open access of the Internet opens individual users and companies to malicious 
threats and attacks which threaten the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of their 
valuable data, resources and businesses. The three key aspects of information security are 
referred to as the CIA triad: confidentiality, integrity and availability. Unsolicited bulk 
messages are informally known as spam. Spam is one of the biggest threats to the internet 
and it costs billions of dollars every year. The objective of this research work is to 
develop an efficient anti-spam mechanism which can stop enough amount of spam. The 
thesis makes significant contributions to this particular research area. 
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2 Spam 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in [15], the word Spam originally referred to "a canned meat product" 
(shown in the following figure) sold by the Hormel Foods Corporation. 
Fig 1, SPAM family of products [16] 
The word spam was later adopted by the Monty Python commedy team in their SP AM 
song whic.h was a comedy sketch set in a restaurant where every dish contained spam, the 
canned meat product [15]. Since then, many other uses of the term have emerged. Most 
later uses of "spam" refer to undesirable repetition. In technology's literature the word 
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spam appears for unsolicited or unwanted bulk messages (e.g. emails, mobile phone calls, 
sms, blogs, VoIP, instant messaging etc). The use of the word spam for unwanted 
messages in electronics is named after the Monty Python sketch [15]. Besides the literal 
meaning of spam, there is no single agreed technical definition of spam. [11], [22] 
However, "unsolicited bulk messages" are informally referred to as spam. Sometimes 
spam is also called junk mail [17], [18]. One of the widely accepted defmition of spam is, 
"Internet spam is one or more unsolicited messages, sent or posted as part of a larger 
collection of messages, all having substantially identical content" [19]. According to 
TREC Spam Track, spam is "unsolicited, unwanted email that was sent indiscriminately, 
directly or indirectly, by a sender having no current relationship with the user" [20]. 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [11] 
has classified the characteristics of spam. According to ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT the primary characteristics of 
spam include: unsolicited, electronic message, sent in bulk and commercial. There are 
some arguments about the commercial characteristics of spam [13]. The remaining 
characteristics as recognized in many definitions are the secondary characteristics. These 
characteristics have been given in the following table: 
Primary characteristics 
Electronic message 
Sent In bulk 
Unsolicited 
Commercial 
Secondary characteristics 
Uses addresses collected without prior consent or knowledge 
Unwanted 
Repetitive 
Untargeted and Indiscriminate 
Unstoppable 
Anonymous and/or disguised 
Illegal or offensive content 
Deceptive or fraudulent content 
Table 1: Primary and secondary characteristics of spam [11] 
Despite the lack of a single definition, the widely accepted and agreed upon general 
characteristics of spam are [21]: Electronic message l , unsolicited message and message 
in large volumes. 
1 Includes email, SMS, VoIP, IM services, Mobile phone Multimedia Messaging Services (MMS) ete 
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All these defmitions convey the message that spam is unsolicited and sent in bulk. The 
problem is that solicitation can not be confirmed because opinions about a message can 
be divided. As discussed in section 3.5.8, a message can be unwanted (unsolicited) for 
most of us but some of us would like to receive it. So far there is no precise definition 
that can be used by servers to filter spam from legitimate messages (also known as non-
spam, genuine message or ham) [22]. It should be noticed that the term spam is normally 
used to refer to spam in email. However, the word spam can be used for spam in other 
applications such as in VoIP, sms, blogs, mobile phone calls and IM etc. In VoIP, spam is 
also called SPIT (Spam over Internet Telephony) and spam in instant messaging is also 
called SPIM (spam in instant messaging). The work of this thesis focuses on spam 
prevention in email and spam in VolP (SPIT). So, in this thesis we will use the word 
spam for both types of spam messages (spam email and spit). However, where necessary 
we would be using the particular tenninology. The following section reviews a brief . 
history of spam. The chapter presents a summary of the problems caused by spam. We 
will also discuss SPIT and the differences between email and voice spam in this chapter. 
2.2 History of spam 
According to Guido Schryen [23], spam was first considered a problem in an RFC in 
1975 [24] and it first appeared in the publications of ACM in 1982 [25]. Michael Specter 
[26] and Templeton [27] have discussed the story of the first spam message which was 
sent by a marketing representative named Gary Thuerk from Digital Equipment 
Corporation (DEC) in the spring of 1978. He wanted to inform people about a powerful 
new computer system to be introduced by his company (DEC). He decided that the best 
way to introduce the product was to send a message to every Arpanet (the predecessor of 
the Internet) address. A very interesting story about this first spam is discussed in detail 
in [26] and [27]. With the push of the send button Thuerk became the father of spam. The 
reaction to the first spam sent by Thuerk was instant and completely aggressive. One of 
the recipients wrote, "This was a flagrant violation of the Arpanet". Thuerk was harshly 
scolded. However DEC sold more than twenty of the computer systems for a million 
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dollars each. Selling this number of computers was a great achievement for DEC in tenus 
of profit. However, even at that time serveral viewed the network as a rising symbol of 
intellectual freedom and did not see any harm in such actions. The Internet pioneer 
Richard Stall man was in favour of the action by Thuerk. After a few days of the DEC 
email, he wrote, "The amount of hanu done by any of the cited unfair things the net has 
been used for is clearly very small". He was among those people who were in the favour 
of the openness that defines the web and opposed any action that places limits to the 
exploitation of this powerful new tool. According to him, the network provided a unique 
opportunity to advertise jobs and an entirely new way to sell products. He added: "Would 
a dating service on the net be frowned upon .... ? I hope not. But even if it is, don't let that 
stop you from notifying me via net mail if you start one." This historic story also reveals 
a number of facts about spam including the different reactions and its benefits (to the 
sparnmer) to name a few. It also shows that (like today) opinions about a spam message 
were divided. It was unsolicited for some but not for others like Richard Stallman, the 
Internet pioneer. Michael Specter [26] says that he has no idea whether anyone on the 
Arpanet tried to help Stallman find a date, but thousands of people have tried to help him 
(Michael Specter). He claims that he receives dozens of email from dating and adult sites 
today. Specter means to say that the problem of spam which was underestimated for 
many years has become a looming problem these days. Some interesting examples of 
early spam attacks are given by Templeton [28]. 
2.3 Causes of spamming 
Sparnmers send spams because they want to make quick money. The price of spamming 
is only a fraction of the cost of other marketing and delivery methods with which a 
merchant can reach thousands and millions of potential customers. Very small 
percentages of the recipients of spam emails click the offers in a spam email and buy the 
advertised product. [29]. However, this small percentage of a huge number (some 
million) of recipients makes spamming more cost-effective then any other advertising 
method. Bekman [30] has discussed the following findings. Sparnmers can send a very 
large amount of spam emails at the cost of a few hundred dollars. Assuming a profit of 
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$25 from each sale, a spammer can make an immediate profit of $10K by sending 
slightly more than 2 million spam emails which is not a difficult job for bots. A study by 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [11], 
in 2003, reveals that the accumulated economic impact of phishing attacks (see section 
2.5.3) was estimated at USD 222 billion. In addition a phisher gets an average profit of 
USD 5000 per successful transaction. 
2.4 Statistics of spam 
In their book on "Understanding Voice over IP Security", lohnston and Piscitello [7] 
mentioned that spam exceeds legitimate messages by 4 times. The following figure shows 
a dramatic increase in the percentage of spam from Dec 2001 to Nov 2005. 
Fig 2, percentage of spam emails in the total email messages [31) 
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Most of the studies like [21] and [31] show that spam emails constitute 80% to 90% of 
the emails. The reason for the difference in different studies is that each study considers 
different definitions of spam and is conducted at different times. Some recent studies 
show that the percentage of spam emails has increased to more than 90%. Since the state-
of-the-art technologies do not cope well with the spam problem, the growth rate is 
expected to increase in future. 
2.5 Problems Caused by Spam 
Spam is a nuisance that has its impacts not only on organisations but also on individuals. 
Looking through spam and sorting out emailswaste a significant amount of time. This in 
turn causes not only loss of work productivity but also irritates the users. The problems 
caused by spam have been discussed in detail in [32], [10], [33], [34]. In this section we 
discuss some major problems caused by spam. 
2.5.1 ProblemslLosses to business communication 
The frightening spam problem has been undervalued due to a lack of investigation of the 
economical impacts of spam. The damages estimated by Ferris Research [33] was 8.9 
billion USD for U.S.-American companies and around 2.5 billion USD for European 
companies (in 2003). In terms of loss of productivity, Marten Nelson of Ferris Research 
found that damage caused by spam (for US-American companies) is up to 4 billion USD 
annual. The damage for U.S.-American and European ISPs (Internet Service Providers) is 
calculated to be around 500 million USD. Key fmdings of the Nucleus Research in 2003 
[10] included the following: 
"The average employee receives 13.3 spam messages per day. 
Time spent per person managing spam ranges from 1 minute to 90 minutes per day, with 
an average of 6.5 minutes. 
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Average lost productivity per employee per year: 1.4% 
Calculation: 6.5 minutes/day divided by 480 total minutes/day 
Average cost of spam per employee per year: $874 
Calculation: 1.4% times 2080 hours at an average fully loaded cost of$30/hour 
For every 690 employees, a full-time IT staff person will be needed just to manage 
spam." 
Nucleus found that spam impacted the productivity of some employees to the extent that 
they invested in desktop filters and learned to use them to combat their spam problem. 
Even with desktop filters, these individuals still spent an average of 12.5 minuies per day 
- nearly twice the average - screening and managing incoming mail, at a cost of $1,625 
per year in lost productivity. In addition the study by Nucleus revealed that apart from 
productivity and IT impact, many companies worry that even with filters; unsolicited e-
mail sent to employees may provoke legal action 
All the above figures are for 2003. Recent research shows far more losses than these. 
Ferris Research Analyzer Information Service [33J estimated that the total worldwide 
jinanciallosses caused by spam in 2005 were $50 billion 
The Radicati Group estimated that 4.9 triIlion spam e-mails would be sent in 2003 with 
an increased growth rate in the future. [11] 
The estimated numbers are different for different studies. The reason is that different 
studies considers different types of spam, harms and assumptions etc. However all studies 
reveal that the spam causes hundreds billion USD loss per annum with an increase in 
growth rate. 
2.5.2 Exposure to Malicious contents 
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One of the most threatening malicious spam contents are viruses. Spams are sometimes 
used by spammers to carry hidden viruses that can get into a system and infect it. The 
infected system then impacts the entire network. "Spyware and adware are other 
problems created by spam that disrupt the flow of your business". [34] It is reported by 
Symantec's Threat Team in their biannual report on Internet Threat that more than 30,000 
pcs per day were being recruited into secret networks to spread spam and viruses in the 
first 6 months of2004 [35]. 
2.5.3 Phishing 
Phishing is one of the most irritating classes of spam which is used for online frauds. 
These fraudulent emails are also called "seam". Such emails misguide or lead to a 
deceptive activity on the part of sender. In a Phishing attack, a sparnmer accesses 
personal informati(:m of the victim (like credit/debit card details or other personal 
information). In a phishing attack, a sparnmer typically asks the victim to click on a 
hyperlink which takes them to a fake web site. These fake web sites are in the control of 
sparnmers. They do so by pretending to be from trust worthy institutions (such as a bank, 
your employer, university or server administration). This is also called "brand spoofing". 
While writing this section of the thesis, the author received a phishing email pretending to 
be from his university and which asks him for his usernameand password. This phishing 
email is as shown in the figure below: 
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ttps:iistaff 'mail,lboro, ac,u~Sessioni21299-GKKxrl:.ZS8anlqg\'lHmK2ipurkzpimessage ,wssp?message T ext=NewWindow&mailbox=INBOX1IMSG=2487 
'8 (} Reply (j Reply To All (?,) Forward )( Delete 
.. Subject: UpdHte Your Loughborough University E-mHiI Account Now! From: UPGRADE TEAt,' 
Jear Ibc!c,ac.uk e-:.ail Ch;J.er, 
I This !.e"sage is f:c~ Ib-cro.ac.uk :!ll2ssaqing center to all 
! Ibc:o.ac.uk e-!r.ail O\,':1er". We are current1:l upqradinq our 
data base and e-::.ail C€:lter. Ke are deleting all u:lU.3ed 
lbcrc.ac.uk e-~ail acc~u~t3 to create space for new c~e3. 
i Te prevent yeu: acc~unt fr:~ closin1 you will have to 
update it below 30 that we will knOh' it3 an existing 
acccu~t. 
COI;:IR.~ YOUR E-Y.m moo: 
! lTa:::e:., •.•...•..•.••. , 
Entail tTserna:r.€ : ••••• 
[;:AIL Passwc:d : """""""" 
CC~1try er Territory: •••••••••• 
h'arninq!!! E-:teil C"(I~er who :ail3 to update his or he:-
€-ltail within Seven days cf receiving this wa:ninq iiill 
!i~k lC3in1 hi3 or her e-~ail aCcD~t ~e:!a~ently. 
Thank yeu fer y:ur U!l:ier!tan:iinq. 
Ibcro,ac,ui !ea= 
!EORO,AC,UK EETA, 
Fig 3, example of phishing email from the author's personal e-mail inbox 
01-08-200804:25 
In response to this phishing email, the email from the IT services department of my 
university (Loughborough) shows that most of the users did not respond to the message 
but it is amazing that many students of the university (who are mature and are in higher 
education) responded to these phishing emails, The email from the IT services is shown 
in the figure below, The highlighted text shows that several students replied to the email. 
This shows the severity of the phishing problem which is delivered as spam, 
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.;;:;;;:. 
Delete 
I> Subject: Emails asking for usernames and passwords From: "Graeme Fowler, IT Se... 03-08-2008 17:50 
Dear Student IT User 
Over the last fe\, ~C!lth3, ~a!ly urt. Universities have l:-een targete:1 by 
b:~3 1L'3~licitej ~ail ~eaaaqe3, requesting that the recipient3 dr;ulqe 
their user na:::es and passwords by replying tc the e:!!ail. Ihere are 
3c~eti=e3 referred tc as l~hishinql attacks. 
Lcuqhbcrcuqh has largely filtered CU~ such targeted ~essage3 up to new, 
but ever the la~t few days ''le have "een an increa~inq nu:r.ber ef attacks 
take place targeted at students, an:! several have l!enage:! to p.ss through 
cur e~5il filtering sy3te~. 
Flease note that we woul:! never ask users to divulge their user nal!es er 
passwords via e".il, so any such re~est is certainly bogus. Flease 
ccntinue n~t to reply to such ::.essages, tout i!l.3teal icn,'ari the:tI to the 
IT Ser\~ce Desk ~~ailto:it.ser;ices@lbcrc.ac.uk>, then delete the:!!. If 
in doubt, please contact the IT Service ,'esK (x2320). 
Please als~ note that, :tc!e gene~'ally, to divulge your u~ema..1le !:ll password 
tc a~y third puty i3B breach ef the University's Acceptable Use Folicy and 
ccul:i potentially result in further actic!'l. 
It is i!l everyone 1 3 interest that you protect your user nue and pas.::nior:1. 
Thank ,'DU fer your continued co-operaticn in this l!etter. 
Grae.e Fowler 
IT Serv"ice3 
Fig. 4, email received from IT support in response to the phishing email in fig 3 
The contents of this practical email show that: 
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• Filtering which is the most popular technique for spam prevention can not stop all 
spam. 
• Even highly educated people fall a prey to phishing attacks 
• Spam produces inconvenience not only for the immediate victims but also for 
other network users 
• The second last paragraph discusses some policies which show that spam 
messages can result in legal issues 
This is an example from a university but such attacks develop more severe problems and 
cause huge losses to big companies and organisations. In an email to the Loughborough 
email account users, the Director of IT, Loughborough University, revealed that 80% of 
the incoming emails to Loughborough University are filtered as spam and this figure 
continues to rise. Another example of such phishing attacks is shown in fig 5 where an 
attacker is interested in the details of the recipient. 
Dear Friend, 
I am W Peter Ruggiero, an internal auditor with Hsbc Bank Plc. 
During our last auditing exercises, as the head of the team, I discovered a dormant account valued 
$19.8 ~1illion dollars. Further investigation about the account revealed that the account holder died 
since 2001. And up till date, nobody has come forward or put application for claim. During my private 
search for the relative recently your name and email contact was among the findings that matches the 
same surname as the decease name who died interstate with no Will or next of kin. 
I am contacting you based on trust, to have you presented as the next of kin and the beneficiary of 
the deposit and I will take care of all necessary paper work to legally declare you the beneficiary of 
the funds. 
If this interest you, kindly respond back immediately with the following 
details:reggieropeter©hotmail.com 
1: Your full names and address. 
2: Your direct cell phone and fax number. 
3: Your age and occupation. 
4: Give me a brief introduction about your self. 
As soon as I received the above details, I will then provide you with full details of the transaction. 
Regards. 
Peter Ruggiero 
Fig 5, example 3 of a phishing attack 
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In such an attack the attacker would first like to gain the trust of the recipient. If the 
recipient replies then later on the attacker asks himlher for more and more 
confidential/personal information. Mostly these types of phishing attacks also contain a 
hyperlink and the recipient is asked to click on the hyperlink to access his or her online 
banking account. This leads the user to a web page that is similar to the web page of 
HSBC in design but is actually a fake web page under the control of the spammer. They 
promise money but first demand money from the users as a service charge to provide start 
up costs or some insurance. To convince the recipient, they make a very good story and 
ask himlher to keep it confidential. In addition spams pretend to be replies to inquiries to 
get people into opening these messages. Opening a mysterious email containing a virus 
puts the system, the entire network and customer information at risk. At the same time it 
is difficult to drop an email just on the basis of suspicions. In some Phishing attacks the 
attacker asks the victim to call a telephone number that is controlled by a phisher. 
Phishing is not restricted to emails; it also attacks the victim in instant messaging, sms 
messages and also on mobile or VoIP phones. 
2.5.4 Opportunity Cost [23] 
A massive spam attack may result in the break of an email system which can lead a 
company or an individual miss an important email.This will cause direct loss of revenue. 
In addition, the most popular anti-spam mechanisms like content filtering do not give 
100% accurate results. Sometimes they result in false positives and false negatives. 
Classifying a legitimate message as a spam message (false positive) can block the ernail 
from a potential customer which can be potentially very costly for the companies and 
organisations (as discussed in section 2.5 of chapter 2). This may also result in the loss of 
existing customers and the opportunity to obtain new customers. 
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2.5.5 Loss of Corporate Assets 
Inappropriate content is often leaked by spam into corporate email accounts. Much of the 
material in junk email is offensive and adult material. This can lead to disputes, costly 
ramifications as well as legal issues. Hwnan resource departments would surely like to 
avoid these problems [34]. 
2.5.6 Effects on the Network Resources 
One of the major impacts of spam is the conswnption of computer and network resources. 
Spam exceeds the required amount of memory and computational power and conswnes a 
lot of network bandwidth. This reduces the amount of data that can be transmitted in a 
fixed amount of time. Organizations may experience storage loss through backing up 
emails that are spam [34]. The spam statistics in section 2.4 show that spam exceeds 4 
times legitimate messages. This means that as compared to legitimate emails, our internet 
resources are used 4 times more by spam emails. At the same time this huge amount of 
spam causes additional traffic in the Internet which in turn produces the need for 
additional storage space and additional computational power [37]. All these loss of 
network resources increases the cost of operations which is also passed on to customers. 
2.5.7 Spam contents - Annoying and offensive 
The advertising messages in spam annoy the users. These advertising messages are 
mostly of no interest for the users. Especially in case of VoIP the repeating ringing tones 
of spam calls early in the morning (say at 2 AM) can be a major threat and fear not only 
for the recipient of a VoIP user but also for the people surrounding him. Sometimes the 
contents of spam are offensive and distasteful. It exposes adults and children to adult 
contents. 
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2.5.8 The Legal Risk of Spam 
Spammers use adware and spyware to turn the computers of innocent persons into spam 
slaves which force their network to do the work of the spammer. If an individual or a 
company's computers become victims of such an attack, they can face a lot of problems 
due to the outgoing spam from their computers. Although many companies neglect this 
problem, however, if spam can be traced to their computer systems they can be totally 
banned by some email servers. This will prevent legitimate email from going through. At 
the same time these innocent persons can be involved legally for violation of the CAN-
SPAM rules (discussed in section 3.2), even though their systems where just zombies, not 
willing participants" [34]. In case of successful phishing attacks, a recipient gives 
personal information or some confidential information to an attacker. This can lead to 
severe legal issues and can put himlher in risk of loosing a job or money (in case of 
credit/debit card details). The second last paragraph of fig 4 in section 2.5.3, states that 
divulging the usemame and password to any third party is a breach of the University's 
Acceptable Use Policy and could potentially result in further action. The same figure also 
shows that several users have responded to the phishing emails targeted at the 
university's email accounts. Apart from that there exist other legal problems associated 
with spam. These include problems related to advertising pornography, pyramid schemes 
etc [38]. 
2.5.9 Impact on Internet Usability 
Some of the impacts of spam on Internet usability have been mentioned in [39]. By 
making the cost of using it prohibitively high, spam makes the Internet less capable of 
supplying information. A lot of time and money is spent on deleting and downloading 
spam. This makes the use of online information less effective. In places like the United 
States, phone service and Internet access is usually paid by monthly fee. In such places 
the issue becomes a matter of time rather than money. Even in such cases the cost 
increases for service providers and network maintainers. This affects the overall cost/fees. 
Statistics show that spam is increasing each year. If people are going to receive large 
amounts of spam, they may be forced to give up much of the Internet experience because 
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they must take so much time going through spam. By the time they go through the spam, 
they may not be able to afford to remain online any longer [39]. 
2.6 SPIT (Spam over Internet Telephony) 
The problem of spam becomes even tougher when considering it in the case of VoIP. In 
VolP spam calls are referred to as SPIT (spam over intemet telephony). SPIT is one of 
the two major threats to VolP and is expected to become a more sever and serious 
problem in the near future. The real challenge is to block a spam call before the telephone 
rings. Most of the antispam techniques which helped in limiting the amount of spam, fail 
totally in preventing SPIT because in VolP we deal with real time voice which doesn't 
accept the processing time without affecting the QoS [40]. Above all it is not a good idea 
to drop a call just on the basis of suspicion. This can drop important calls [40] which will 
be ofloss to the VolP user. 
2.7 Differences between email and voice spam 
SPIT is similar to email spam in many aspects. For example the causes/aims and impacts 
of spit and spam are similar. However, spam email deals with text while SPIT works with 
voice. Therefore, some of the popular techniques used for preventing spam emails fail in 
the scenario of SPIT due to the real time behaviour ofVolP. In addition, when compared 
to spam email the impacts of SPIT are more immediate and in most cases more severe. 
Currently the rate of SPIT calls is very low when compare to the rate of spam emails. 
However, with the increase in the popularity ofVolP, it is expected that SPIT will occur 
with a frequency similar to email spam in the near future. Although email spam is a 
nuisance, the impacts of SPIT on a user are far more irritating than email spam. SPIT 
upsets instantly and a SPIT call will disturb not only you (the recipient) but also your 
colleagues surrounding you. Emails don't interrupt the users and can be checked at 
intervals. However phone calls are interrupting and they need attention. The recipient of a 
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call either answers it or at least checks to see who the caller is. This means that the 
reaction of users to phone calls is as soon as they receive it. 
Deleting a spam email is quite simple when compared to dealing with SPIT calls 
especially when they are received at midnight or early in the morning. At the same time 
phone or VolP calls are more urgent, interrupting, and attention-getting than an email due 
to which we can not turn off our mobile phone. In cases where we want to convey urgent 
messages, we use telephony services so a VolP user will receive an immediate ring in the 
case of a SPIT call. Receiving a number of SPIT calls (say equal in number to the 
average number of spam emails a user receives) in the voice mail would be very 
annoying. Relative to email spam it takes more time to delete spit calls because in the 
later case the user would have to listen to every message (at least a portion of it) before 
deleting it. This means increased loss of productivity as compare to email spam. In 
addition the impact of SPIT on network resources is more severe when compared to 
email spam because it has the potential of clogging up the network [41] and consumes 
more bandwidth. This may also force the users to leave VoIP. 
Another issue with SPIT is that we cannot perform filtering based on the contents of the 
call. Content filtering is the most popular approach for preventing spam but most of these 
antispam techniques which helped in limiting the amount of spam, failed totally while 
dealing with VoIP. As QoS is not an issue with email so an email is first received by a 
server that can apply many filtering strategies and then makes it available to be 
downloaded by the user. In contrast, VolP deals with voices rather than text. "To 
recognize voices and to determine whether the message is a spit or not is still a very 
difficult task for a computer" [40]. 
Another reason which makes it hard or nearly impractical to use content filtering 
mechanisms for preventing SPIT calls is that in case of VolP a recipient finds out about 
the message (or contents of the call) when he or she has received the call and is listening 
to it. This means that content filtering techniques can be applied only after the user has 
received the call. That is by the time when the user is subjected to all the impacts of 
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spam. Also VoIP is very sensitive to delay and requires a certain degree of QoS. Using 
filtering techniques on the contents of voice could significantly degrade the quality of 
sound Also it is relatively very easy for the user to delete an email spam. However, 
receiving a SPIT call means the telephone rings and disturbs the users at any time of day. 
Also it is not good to drop a call just on the basis of doubt. This can drop important calls 
[40] which will be ofloss to the VoIP user. In cases where we want to convey urgent 
messages, we use telephony services. So in case ofVoIP phones we have to set our phone 
to ring mode for the unidentified persons and we will receive ring tones for regular calls 
and also for SPIT calls which will of course be unsatisfactory. 
David Endler and Mark Collier [42] have expressed the severity of SPIT relative to email 
spam in the following phrase which shows the user reaction to SPIT: 
"I don't know what is worse. Digging through my voicemail and deleting all the SP AM or 
getting 25 calls a day trying to sell me Viagra. I think I am going to just turn this stupid 
phone off'. 
2.8 Summary 
Spam is a major threat to the efficiency of the Internet. Spam emails are 4 times (80%) 
more frequent than ham emails. The lack of a single agreed definition of spam contributes 
to the inefficiency of the filtering mechanisms. Spam creates a lot of problems including 
impacts on businesses, phishing, loss of cOlporate assets, legal issues, impacts on network 
resources and exposure to viruses, spyware and Adware to name a few. The losses caused 
by sparn are billions of dollars every year. The growth rate of sparn is constantly 
increasing due to the inefficiency of the state-of-the-art antispam techniques. It is 
expected that spanuners will badly exploit the network resources if researchers don't 
come up with an efficient anti-spam mechanism. The huge increase in sparn is the cause 
for the unexpected overload in bandwidth, server storage capacity and loss of end-user 
productivity for email systems. The problem of SPIT is more severe than spam. 
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3 State-of-the-Art Anti-spam 
Mechanisms 
3.1 Introduction 
A number of measures have been proposed and implemented to prevent spam but the fact 
is that none of the approaches has been able to prevent sufficient spam to solve the 
problem. To solve the problem the anti-spam approaches can be divided into four broad 
categories. These include legislative, technological, collaborative and social awareness. 
The legislative approaches make spam illegal whereas the social awareness (or educating 
users) aim at educating the users to leam about spam, its causes, problems and how to 
minimise or get rid of this nuisance. The collaborative approaches work for possible 
types of cooperation between national authorities, companies and users. The purpose of 
technological approaches is to prevent the delivery of spam and/or to make it difficult 
[43]. In this chapter we discuss these anti-spam approaches in detail. In addition to that 
we will discuss some potential problems caused by the existing anti-spam mechanisms. 
We will see that current mechanisms are not efficient enough to overcome the problems 
caused by spam. 
3.2 Anti-Spam Legislations: 
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The severity and the extent of problems caused by spam (as discussed in section 2.5) both 
to users and organisations have compelled many countries and federal states to 
implement legislation for preventing spam. Many countries including the United States, 
the European Union, Australia, Canada and United Kingdom have recently implemented 
legislation to combat Unsolicited Commercial Communication. Some of the most 
prominent legislations regarding spam prevention are European Union (EU) Privacy and 
Electronic Communications Directive, and US CAN-SP AM Act. 
The Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002l581EC [44] was 
passed by European Parliament in July 2002. Each EU member had to implement this 
legislation by 31 st October 2003. This law focused on: Protecting the rights of people by 
reducing spam and guaranteeing the individual's control over personal relationships and 
contacts. The directive regulates some sort of opt-in approaches (which requires that the 
sender has the recipient's permission prior to sending). The directive also requires each 
marketing email to contain infonnation about the Opt-out mechanism (in which the 
recipient is provided with infonnation on how to decline and stop the receipt of further 
emails from the sender). An overview of the directive is given by Nicola Lugaresi in [45]. 
Article 13 (paragraph 1) of the Directive [44] states: "The use of automated calling 
systems without human intervention (automatic calling machines), facsimile machines 
(fax) or electronic mail for the purposes of direct marketing may only be allowed in 
respect of subscribers who have given their prior consent." Further paragraph 4 of article 
13 mentions: "In any event, the practice of sending electronic mail for purposes of direct 
marketing disguising or concealing the identity of the sender on whose behalf the 
communication is made, or without a valid address to which the recipient may send a 
request that such communications cease, shall be prohibited." 
The EU Directives apply to all unsolicited commercial communications received on and 
sent from networks in the EU. However the enforcement and identification of sparnmers 
becomes quite complicated when emails are generated in third countries. 
US CAN-SPAM Act 0(2003 is another anti-spam legislation. The acronym CAN-SPAM 
is derived from the bill's full name: Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited 
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Pornography and Marketing Act. It is the United States' first national standard fO,r the 
distribution of commercial e-mail and needs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to 
impose its provision [46]. It allows the senders to send unsolicited commercial emails 
(UCE) until the recipient refuses receipt. It places several other restrictions. It prohibits: 
deceptive subject lines, harvest email addresses on the web, use of illegally captured 
computers to relay the messages and false or misleading header information. It requires 
that commercial messages be identified as advertisements and the senders must include 
their valid physical postal address. The message must contain an opt-out link for the 
recipient. 
The anti-spam activists commonly refer to CAN-SPAM Act as the YOU-CAN-SPAM 
Act (means that with this law you can spam) because the opt-out rule in the bill does not 
require e-mailers to get permission before they send marketing messages [46]. 
It is worth mentioning that anti-spam laws have not used the term "spam" because its 
legislative semantics have not yet been defined. For more information on this topic, refer 
to the paper on, "Combating spam through legislation: A comparative analysis of US and 
European approaches" [38]. The overview of anti-spam legislation of different countries 
can be seen in the surveys carried out by the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) [21] and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
[47]. The studies of ITU and OECD reveal that many countries have no or non-effective 
anti-spam legislation. There is no legislation information for large parts of the world like 
Africa, Latin America, Large parts of Asia and the Middle East. 
The legislative approach has achieved very little success in the war against spam and fig 
7 shows, that the compliance with the CAN-SPAM act was low from the very beginning. 
It became even lower in the following years. The figure clearly shows the increase in the 
growth rate of spam. Apart from Sybil attacks (where the spanuners change their 
identities), the spammers use address spoofing and zombies (controlled PCs of innocent 
users) which make it very difficult to trace them. In addition, the lack of a widely agreed 
and well accepted spam definition makes it impossible to have a homogenisation of 
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worldwide anti-spam legislations. Also many countries still do not have anti-spam 
legislations which complicates the enforcement and identification. All of these problems 
contribute to creating difficulties in the regulation of spam and the implementation of the 
anti-spam laws. 
There is a broad consensus that spam must be fought with a combination of anti-spam 
measures including legislation, collaboration, technological approaches and social 
awareness. As discussed by [12] the legislative approach can be fully exploited only if we 
have global harmonisation of anti-spam legislations, international cooperation for sharing 
information and cross-border investigations and prosecutions related to spam and proper 
funding and training of the anti-spam organisations and bodies (both technical and 
legislative). 
The following figure shows the percentage of world wide internet email identified as 
spam from 2003 to 2005. 
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Fig 6, percentage of world wide internet email identified as spa m [21] 
The resultant line shows that spam increased from 40% in 2003 to 80% in 2005. It means 
that in 2005 the total number of spam emails was 4 times that of ham emails. 
3.3 Social Awareness 
An approach to the spam problem from a different angle is by social awareness. The 
efforts which come in this type of approach include educating the users about the causes 
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and problems of spam and the procedures that can be implemented to reduce it. Warning 
the users ofphishing attacks also comes under this category. The idea is that when people 
receive emails and messages from banks, employers, organisations and/or universities 
they do not fall a prey to phishing as they know how to deal it in each case as received. 
The course on "Spam and Spyware" [48], [49] offered at the university of Calgary, 
Alberta, Canada is a good example of this category of anti-spam approaches. The course 
is offered in the computer science department and is available at both the undergraduate 
and graduate levels. The course looks at examining the problems caused by spam, the 
different anti-spam approaches and their performance. Students are also given hands-on-
. experience on developing software for spamming, spyware and how to prevent them. All 
these practical experiments are carried out in a secure lab. 
3.4 Collaborative Approaches 
To achieve better spam filtering this approach uses the collaboration of users, companies, 
organisations and authorities. They share their knowledge and exchange opinions about 
spam and ham. (See for example [50], [51]). Reports are also gathered from users on a 
mail server (such as Google's Gmail l ). Abuse systems (systems which are meant to help 
the Internet users to report and control spam and other network abuse) are good examples 
of collaborative approaches. However abuse systems are subjected to the same drawbacks 
as shown by reputation systems (discussed in section 3.5.6). The Honey Pot project [52] 
is one approach which aims to identify email address harvested with the help of specially 
generated emails.However.this approach can not prevent all and has an issue of privacy 
that arises due to the exchange of data between users. At the same time this approach 
needs collaboration from the users who are not always willing to participate. In addition it 
is also subjected to false praise. The Self-regulatory Plan on Tackling Spam, SpotSpam 
project [53] recently launched by the EU is an important step towards achieving the goals 
of Abuse systems that is to help users submit spam complaints to the SpotSpam database 
at the international level. One other popular example of the international cooperation in 
the war against spam is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) [54] between the UK, 
1 http://gmaiLgoogle.coml 
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USA and Australia. Another example is the London Action Plan (LAP) [55] (formed in 
October 2004) in which member'organisations from 27 different countries met to discuss 
the international cooperation against spam. 
3.5 Anti-spam Technological approaches 
Many techniques have been proposed and implemented to prevent spam. However, as 
mentioned in [56], "None of the schemes is the "magic bullet" that some proponents 
claim". In this section we discuss some popular anti-spam technologies. 
3.5.1 Payments 
Research shows that one of the main reasons for spam is the fact that the cost of sending 
spam is almost zero for a spammer. It has been proposed (e.g. in [57] and [59]) to charge 
the sender of the email, small payment for sending an email. The payment is kept so 
small that it remains negligible for a legitimate user but potentially high for the 
spammers. This would prevent a spammer from broadcasting nlillions of messages. 
However this is a difficult trade off and the implementation of such a payment 
,infrastructure can be an ambitious endeavour [40]. 
The Zmail protocol [58] is one of the versions of the payments' approach. In this 
approach the sender pays a small fee to the receiver. The idea is to give neither damage 
nor loss to a common email user who sends and receives nearly equal amount of 
messages. At the same time it aims at making spamnling costly for the spammers. 
Another version of the payment mechanism has been discussed in the paper on "Bankable 
Postage for Network Services" [59]. In this mechanism the sender is charged a small 
amount of money (in the form of a ticket) but if the receiver decides that the call1email is 
not spam then the sender is paid back the money (or ticket). It is worth mentioning that 
the proposers of this mechanism concluded in [58] that, "There remain numerous 
questions about the ticket server. As discussed earlier, deployment of the service raises 
several tricky issues. Many of the same issues arise with other schemes for email 
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payment: in all cases, deployment is difficult, involving fondamental and disruptive 
changes to the way that Internet email works. It 's not at all clear that we can achieve 
such changes H. 
There is a lot of risk involved in this mechanism especially in the presence of address 
spoofing and zombies. This is also subjected to false praise. The overview of "The Penny 
Black Project" [60] from Microsoft Research reveals that the payment can be in the form 
of several currencies: CPU cycles, memory cycles, turing test etc. The approach of 
Microsoft Research is fundamentally an economic one. The idea behind this approach is 
that spammers would have to invest heavily in hardware in order to send high volumes of 
spam. 
The payments approach has many concerns and can not be implemented. The ernail and VoIP 
users are unwilling to pay for anything extra for ernails and VoIP. Also these payment 
mechanisms are subjected to false praise and create a significant problem in delivering 
legitimate/solicited bulk emails. The mechanism introduced by the "Penny Black Project" can 
cause loss to legitimate users in the presence of bots and zombies. The payment approach is 
against the open flavour of Internet and is expected to punish legitimate users for the 
misbehaviours of others. Brad Templeton [61] has discussed the limitations, drawbacks and 
challenges involved with such payment systems. 
3.5.2 White and Black Lists 
In white lists a user explicitly states which persons are allowed to contact himlher. Each 
user has two types of lists. Persons in the white list are trusted persons and are given the 
connection. However addresses in the black lists are for spammers and they cannot be 
given the SMTP connection. These lists can be maintained locally or can be provided 
publicly. There are different variants of white and black lists including DNS-based 
(Domain Name System-based) white and black lists, Uniform resource Identifier (URI) 
based white and black lists. Skype also uses a similar technique. 
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[62] has discussed the DNS-Based Blacklists and its limitations. The main disadvantage 
of this system is that it is very difficult to up-to-date the white and black lists. The 
spammers change their identities and/or addresses (using Sybil attacks) which lead to 
false negatives. Blacklisting the spoofed address of a legitimate user (which is abused by 
a spammer) can block the ham emails of customers (false positives) which can be of great 
loss to the customers. On the other hand the problem with the white list is that it is not 
possible to receive messages by someone who has not yet been put on the white list 
explicitly (Introduction Problem). 
3.5.3 Grey Listing 
Greylisting as discussed in detail by Evan Harris [63] is based on the assumption that 
spammers do not always retry sending their messages and if a spammer retries, he would 
be listed in the blacklist which would prevent him from sending email in the future. For 
every SMTP transaction, this technique looks for three pieces of information called a 
"triplet" which is stored in the receiving MTA (Mail Transfer Agent). The three pieces of 
information are: The IP address of the server attempting the delivery, the email address of 
the sender (arguments of the MAIL FROM command) and the email address of the 
recipient (arguments of the RCPT command). According to this rule if the triplet has been 
never seen before (that is if this message is neither in the whitelist nor in the blacklist) 
then respond to the server by temporarily refusing delivery. Greylisting is based on the 
assumption that spammers mostly use applications which ignore error messages and they 
don't retry. [63] "Mail server implementations that conform to the SMTP specifications 
will wait for a while, and then attempt to resend the message" [7]. Based on the receipt of 
a retransmitted message the grey listing email server will conclude that the email is 
legitimate. 
Spammers have developed new software packages that retry delivery to other MX (Mail 
Exchanger) hosts for a domain if delivery through one MX fails. Also it's not effective 
unless ALL of the MX hosts for a particular domain use mail software that incorporates 
it. In addition to this grey listing can cause delay in the delivery of a legitimate piece of 
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mail. "A legitimate piece of mail may get significantly longer than expected if there are 
enough MX hosts in the mix, even to the point that the sending server may give up and 
bounce the mail" [63]. Considering the fact as discussed previously that the spam traffic 
is 4 to 5 times more pervalent than the legitimate email traffic, Greylisting results in an 
increase of email traffic because most of the emails will be resent. This also leads to the 
conclusion that this technique does not take into account the network resources' abuse. In 
addition the users may experience unwanted delays due to congestion on the network. 
Since the IP addresses of the host changes, Greylisting can result in false positives (where 
a legitimate email is not received by the recipient) in cases where an email never passes 
the triplet rule. Also the mechanism fails against address spoofing where a spammer can 
spoofIP address and the address of the MAIL FROM command (sender's address). 
3.5.4 Sender Verification (ChaUenge/Response) 
The idea behind this mechanism is that spammers send millions of spam emails and are 
unable to reply to any response sent back to them by the receiving host. The sender is 
provided with a challenge to prove hislher identity. The challenge is chosen such that it is 
difficult for computers but easy for humans. These challenges can be simple tests which 
request the sender's email client to perform a mathematical computation or provide him 
with an image and ask him to enter the word given in the image. Once the sender 
responses successfully to the challenge, his message is delivered. Due to the challenge 
and response characteristics of the verification mechanism, it is also called the challenge-
response mechanism. This mechanism distinguishes human senders from auto-generated 
spams (also called bots) and prevents the spammers from using automated methods to 
send spams. One such approach is CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing 
Test to Tell Computers and HumansApart) algorithms [64]. CAPTCHA is a type of 
challenge-response test, used to ensure that the response is not generated by a computer. 
The figure below shows an example of a CAPTCHA procedure. The distorted text given 
in the figure below can be read by a human but it can not be read by current computer 
programs. 
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Fig 7, distorted Text which can be read by humans but not by current computer 
programs [64] 
In case ofVolP, it has been proposed that the same result can be achieved by introducing 
noise or music in the audio signal and then asking the user to repeat the voice which will 
prevent spitters from using speech recognition. These are also called Turing tests. 
The problem with this approach is that that the distorted text or the enriched (with noise 
or music) audio signal should not be too cluttered to be understood by a legitimate user. 
Especially in the case of VolP the problem of different accents and different languages 
can complicate the communication process and it would be very difficult for a caller to 
understand the noise enriched audio voice. Introduction of noise to the audio signals will 
add to the inconvenience. At the same time if we make it too easy the intelligent 
recognition softwares used by sparnrners could identify the letters and numbers (in the 
distorted text) or voice (in case of VoIP). Another drawback of this mechanism is that 
apart from bots it can not prevent other forms of spam (those sent manually by 
sparnrners). The mechanism also complicates the sending of solicited bulk messages (like 
newsletter) which will become impossible or costly in the presence of challenges. This is 
because each challenge will need a human resource. 
In addition spammers bypass this mechanism by social engineering attacks. For example 
whenever an auto-spam generating computer comes across a challenge (given on some 
legitimate site), it sends the challenge to a pom viewer on the web pages of a pom 
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website. On accessing the adult web page the spammers promise the user access to the 
adult site by responding to the challenge. The moment the user enters the letters and 
numbers, they are fed into the relevant legitimate sites and the spammers bypass the 
challenge step. The spammer succeeds in sending; spams. In this case the pom site viewer 
is entering the letters and numbers for the spammers. 
3.5.5 Cryptographic puzzles 
In cryptographic puzzles [65], before establishing the connection, a caller/sender is asked 
. to solve a small puzzle which consumes computational resources like CPU and 
bandwidth. [66] (Note: This technique is not a challenge-response mechanism in which 
the server provides a challenge for each message). This approach is based on the 
assumption that the computational power of a spammer is limited so the request for the 
number of parallel connections in a spam attack would weaken the computational power 
of a spammer in a massive spam attack. However, using zombies (which are virus-
infected machines and are used to fulfil the jobs of spammers) spammers can hijack 
computers and can gain unlimited computational power. As discussed in the "Honeynet 
Project & Research Alliance" [67], spammers can send (some million) spam e-mails by 
distributing the total required CPU time required among many hosts. In such a scenario 
the idea of cryptographic puzzles not only fails but also causes a significant loss of 
resources to legitimate users. Another drawback of this approach is that a legitimate user 
with a slow machine can experience unacceptable delays due to the challenges [40]. 
3.5.6 Reputation Systems 
In this system a recipient (organisation) is given a hint about the reputation of the 
sender/caller before receiving the message (emaillcall). Based on the reputation of the 
sender/caller, the recipient accepts (when reputation is good) or rejects (when reputation 
is poor). This system is susceptible to false praise which can lead to both false positives 
(classifying legitimate messages as spam) and false negatives (classifying spam as 
legitimate messages). In addition the system doesn't provide any protection against 
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address spoofing which can result in false negatives. The situation can become even more 
severe when the spammers send thousands of spam messages using the spoofed address 
of a legitimate user. In such a case the address of the legitimate innocent user would be 
blacklisted and hislher reputation will be badly destroyed. This will block all his 
messages which would be a great loss not only for the customer but also for the service 
provider. The system is ineffective against Sybil attacks (in which a spammer changes his 
identity) or opens a new account. Reputation systems have been discussed in [68] 
3.5.7 Modifying Transmission Protocols 
One of the drawbacks of existing email transmission protocols (like SMTP) is that they 
don't provide a mechanism for checking the identity of the message source. It has been 
proposed to enhance or even substitute the existing standards of email transmission in 
order to overcome this drawback [13]. However there are a number of obstacles in this 
kind of approach. Similarly the problem of fake IP addresses in email messages and 
. finding ways to overcome it by changes in the existing standards has been discussed by 
Goodman in [69]. 
3.5.8 Content Filtering 
As mentioned in [7], [13] and the study by Siponen and Sucke [70], content filtering is 
the most popular anti-spam technique. It works on heuristic methods and more than 80 
percent of the current antispam solutions available on market today make use of the 
Bayesian filtering methods [71]. The technique first identifies word sets and a database of 
words as spam. The filtering mechanism then checks the contents (body), header or both 
parts of the email against these word sets and data base of words. Based on the result of 
the comparison, the filtering mechanism can classify the email as either spam or ham. 
Some filters work on collaborative approaches where different servers share information 
about spam emails and update their filters. 
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All the filter-based approaches show false negatives and false positives. The false 
negative is a nuisance for the users but the later one can be of great loss to a company or 
organisation. Tuning the parameters of the spam filters to intercept spam and ensuring 
that legitimate emails are not filtered is a difficult balance. A single potential customer's 
email (say application of a potential student for admission into a university) that is 
filtered as spam (false positive) is potentially very costly to the company or organisation 
(in the case of student to a university). Currently there is no filtering mechanism that can 
give 100% accurate results (i.e. to find an accurate and precise difference between 
legitimate and spam messages) and in fact we do not think that such a filtering 
mechanism is possible due to the lack of a single technical definition of spam (which can 
be used by filters) and for the reasons given below. 
Companies can set harsher parameters in SP AM filters, and also enable so-called 
'Bayesian-filtering' that allows SPAM to be identified based on trends and probabilities. 
This would stop a significant amount of SP AM, but at the same time it would block a 
significant number of legitimate emails which is not acceptable to the users for the 
reasons given above. The only option left is to try and strike the right balance for users. 
That is to set some lineant parameters in sparn filters which will stop a good percentage 
of spam emails but still allowing an annoying amount of SP AM in order to get ensure a 
certain level of probability that legitimate emails are not filtered. 
Spams pretend to be replies or follow-ups to previous enquiries. In addition sparnmers 
keep on changing the way their message is written (structure). They do so by using 
misspellings, punctuation, spaces, images (more recently) and other methods to evade the 
filters. Thus filters need to continue learning and training which is not totally exhaustive 
and is very costly as well. For example instead of using the word "Hot" they may write 
"HOt" (note the number 0 instead of the second letter 0) to deceive the filters. More 
recently sparnmers use images which make it very difficult for the filters to achieve their 
goals. The existing state-of-the-art algorithms can be used for image-based filtering only 
if the specific features are extracted from the images. Extracting these features is very 
difficult for the state-of-the-art filters. Aradhye et al. [72] and Wu et al. [73] have 
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proposed some approaches that could be used to extract features from images in image-
based filtering but they are not exhaustive. 
It is important to mention that all of these anti-spam mechanisms can be part of a 
comprehensive approach to fighting spam. None of these mechanisms can detect and 
block sufficient spam to be deemed a solution to the spam problem themselves [56]. 
Problems caused by lack of a single technical definition of spam 
Christopher Lueg [32] has discussed the problems related to the lack of a single technical 
definition of spam. In many cases, opinions about a spam message may be divided. We 
take the example of political messages which may be 'unsolicited' for some people but 
many might be willing to receive them. Similarly jokes may be unsolicited for some but 
many simply like to receive them. "So far there is no precise technical definition of 
(email) spam that could be used by mail servers to verify "solicitation" exists. In fact we 
do not think that such a definition is possible" [32]. We consider the example of the 
following email given by Lueg [32] to illustrate the point: 
"Date: Sat, 29 Mar 2003 09: 15 :07 -0800 
From: Kate <beatwar@mega781.com> 
To: [author's email address] 
Subject: Should America be at War? 
Message-ID: <155195208-1463747838-1048958107@b.Mega78.com> 
With the current situation in the Middle East, we're conducting a United States Consumer 
survey about the WAR WITH IRAQ and we'd like to invite you to help us out. Let your 
opinions be heard amongst Americans and the world! After answering the question 
above, you qualifY to receive a complimentary* USA T-shirt. Your opinion counts! 
{ ... I" 
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In the context of the war in Iraq it is more than likely that quite a few concerned people 
would be willing to look at the email as it fits their emotional situation. On the other hand 
many people would consider it as unsolicited. 
"There is a need to define what spam is, as the frequently used term "spam" is not a legal 
term, which may involve some misunderstandings about the real object of the discipline" 
[38]. 
Due to the lack of a precise technical definition of spam, all the content filtering 
algorithms have the drawback of finding an accurate and precise difference between 
legitimate and spam messages. They may result in false negatives (classifying a spam 
message as legitimate). At the same time they may result in false positives (considering a 
legitimate message as spam and thus blocking or preventing it) which will annoy the user. 
The later case can be of great loss to companies, organizations or customers. Given below 
are two examples which illustrate how content-based filtering methods may prevent 
delivery oflegitimate content or email: 
i. A friend tells another friend about a really great deal on a product that they found. 
Based on the words in the email, the filters may categorise it as spam 
(advertisement email) and will block it [74]. 
ii. A similar incident happened when members of the British parliament did not 
receive messages relating to the "Sexual Offences Bill" under discussion (Heise 
Online News, 2003). Assumed to be porn, these messages had been filtered by 
anti-spam filters [74]. 
A number of solutions have been proposed (such as [75] and [76]) to overcome the 
problem of the lack of technical definition and to train the filters. But the fact is revealed 
by the Taughnack report which states that, "Although none of the schemes is the 
"magic bullet" that some proponents claim, some of them, particularly when used 
in combination with each other, can help limit the amount of spam that users 
receive" [56]. 
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It is worth mentioning that content filtering does not take into account the prevention of 
the precious network and/or Internet resources. As mentioned by Enrico Blanzieri and 
Anton Bryl [13] that filtering solves the problems caused by spam only partially which 
prevents end-users from wasting their time on junk messages. But it should be noticed 
that since all the messages are delivered nevertheless, therefore this mechanism does not 
prevent resource misuse. At the same time these techniques are probabilistic (prevent the 
delivery of spam with a certain probability). The spammers know that a small percentage 
of their spam emails would be delivered successfully. This convinces the spammers to 
send more spam to increase the number of delivered emails.This will lead to large 
amount of resource consumption. In addition existing content filtering mechanisms do a 
lot of processing while checking the contents (body) of the message. This uses the 
network and processor resources and the network gets congested due to the huge amount 
of spam data. 
Many filtering research works claim that the accuracy of their filtering algorithms is 
above 90%. However it is worth mention that these are the results during the 
experimental evaluation of these filtering algorithms. These results are based on 
empirical testing and their data sets are small when compared to the global data set of 
spam. At the same time their data sets may not be up to date. Due to these reasons we 
believe that in practice the actual accuracy of these filtering algorithms is less than the 
results shown by the empirical tests. Also due to these reasons we can not compare the 
results of different filtering algorithms because different algorithms use different 
definitions of spams and different data sets for evaluating their performance. 
Examples a/filtering mechanisms: 
There are many types of filtering mechanisms. Some popular filtering mechanisms have 
been discussed in [77], [78], [79] and [80]. In this section we discuss two popular spam 
filtering techniques: Rule-based filtering and Signature-based filtering. 
Rule-based filtering: 
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In such a filtering mechanism the contents of the email are checked against the database 
of words. A simple rule can be: If the subject contains "HOT GIRLS" and the body of the 
email contains "Find a friend" then the rule can decide that it is a spam. However, this 
filtering mechanism can be easily overcome by sparnmers with an effort as little as 
misspelling or using words which can classify it as a ham email. For example, replacing 
the letter "0" in "HOT" with a number zero "0". That is "HOT Girls" instead of "HOT 
GIRLS". 
Signature-based filtering: 
Using an algorithm such as a hash function, this method first calculates the signature of 
the whole message. Instead of comparing the whole contents, it then compares this 
signature against a database of known spam signatures. The main disadvantage of such an 
approach is that with slight variations in the contents of the message the resulting 
signature is different and it is difficult to update the known spam signatures database. 
Spammers change the contents of the same messages. This is shown in the following 
figure that the author received. 
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<) ~ I ~ Reply ~ Reply To All 6:; Forward )( Delete 
.. ~-~"-.'-. .~-" - .--~.~,,---., .... ~~~ -~-.---~---.'''' 
~ Subject: NOTICE!!! From: Loughborough Univers". 22-07-2008 17:35 
Attention E-r·1ail Account Holder, 
LAST NOTICE 
We are currently performing maintenance for our Digital mail Account owners due to the rate of intern et passwords 
and other information problems. And we" discovered that our mail account owners have been receiving phishing 
mails form imposters asking for their personal informations. So we intend upgrading our Digital mail Security Server 
for better online services. 
In order to ensure you do not experience service interruption, Please you must reply to this email immediately and 
enter your USERNA~1E here: (""x,,,x'XX) and PASSWORD here:(""""'''') 
for security reasons and Check out your new features and enhancements with your new and improved mail 
account. To enable us upgrade your Account; for better online services please reply to this mail. 
NB: We request your username and password for Identification purpose only. 
© Copyright Loughborough University 
Loughborough University 
Leicestershire, UK, LEll 3TU 
Take Address • ;$. ~ 
local intr anet ifi 100% '.: 
Figure 8, example 1 of a phishing email from the author's email inbox 
As a result of this phishing attack, the spammer obtained usemames and passwords of 
several accounts. Some students also reported this to the IT service. The author 
understands that the IT service people would have configured their filters to tackle this 
spam message in the future. However, the spammers are also aware of this. After a few 
days, the sparnmer attacked with a second email (shown below), the message was same 
(in terms of meaning) but the content and structure was different. So, these two emails are 
same in meaning but wiII give different signatures. The spammer was successful even in 
the second attempt. 
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I U https:flstaff·ma~.~OIo.ac.ukJSession(21299·GKKxrk1S8anlqgV9HmK2·ipurkzpImessage.wssp?message T ext=NewWindow&mailbox= INBOX&MSG=24B7 • 
<:'i ~. et Reply Q, ReplyTo All L.O Forward)(Delete Hx 
1 ~ Subject: Update Your Loughborough University E-mail Account Now! From: UPGRADE TEAM " 01-08-2008 04:251 ~ 
C'ear lbo!c.ac.uk e-!ail m~'!ler, 
This ~e3sage is frc~ Ib~rc.ac.uk ~essaqing center to all 
Ib::o.a.c,uk e-:eil c\o::e:3. Ke a:t currently upq:a1inq CUI 
data 1:ase an1 e-mail centtr. i~e are deletin~ a1l unused 
Ibcro.ac,uk e-~J:il accounts to create Bp~ce for new ones. 
10 ~:eyent yeur a:CCU!lt frc:lt clcsing yeu "ill r.avf to 
u;jate it telo\; 30 that 'if niH k:l~w its an existinq 
acccunt. 
COllF!R.~ YOUR H.AIL BELOW: 
If:..":.e: •••••••••• , to •• ,. 
£lai1 U3e~a:e : .•.•• 
EY.AIL Fas3i<1"C:d : ., ••••• , •••••••• 
Country er Territc!i' : •.•••••••• 
K!~ni!l~!!! E-:tail C~'!ler h'hO fail! to u~1ate hi! or her 
e-!:ail wit!lh Seve!l da:t'3 ef receivin~ this ~'arri!l~ ,..-ill 
ri"k lcsit~ his er her e-:r.ail acc::u."lt ~=a!le!ltll" 
rhank you fo~ ycur und'~'tanding. 
ICcro,ac,tk Tea! 
IE8RO.A:,~t. E:!A. 
Fig 9, spammer of email in fig 5, changed contents and structure of email to deceive 
the filters 
Figure 10 shows an overview and classification of the SPIT prevention methods. 
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RM.rJin!~ ma~:.~iv~ administration 
han1em,d by background 
Fig 10, overview and classification of SPIT prevention methods [40] 
There are a lot of other techniques which have been used for preventing spam but the fact 
is that spam is still a problem for users. The facts about the perfonnance of these 
mechanisms can be identified by the following two statements: 
Taughannock Networks mentions in their report on Technical responses to spam [56] 
"We believe that technical means can be part of a comprehensive approach to fighting 
spam, but we don't believe that any technical approaches, individually or in combination, 
can detect and block enough spam to be deemed a solution to the spam problem . .. 
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Rainer Baumann and his colleagues mention in their report on "Voice over IP - security 
and SPAM" (40), "There is no panacea for the spam problem". 
3.6 Summary 
A number of measures have been proposed and implemented to solve the problem of 
spam. These include legislative, collaborative, social awareness and technological 
approaches. Each measure has certain drawbacks and limitations. Content filtering is the 
most popular anti-spam technological approach but all the filter-based approaches show 
false negatives and false positives. False positives are potentially very costly to users, 
service providers, companies and organisations. None of the approaches individually or 
in combination with other approaches, can detect sufficient spam to be deemed a solution 
to the spam problem. All of the anti-spam mechanisms can be part of a comprehensive 
approach to fighting spam. The limitations of the state-of-the-art mechanisms create a 
high demand for an efficient anti-spam mechanism. 
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4 Spam Prevention using Access 
Code, SPAC 
4.1 Introduction to the SP AC mechanism 
Based on the current state-of-the-art there exists no antispam technique which can 
prevent sufficient spam to be deemed a solution for the spam problem. At the same time 
these mechanisms have some negative impacts on the distribution of the legitimate 
messages. The severity of the spam problem and the limitations of the state-of-the-art 
create a strong desire for a spam prevention mechanism with the following features: 
• Prevents the different types of spam attacks (including bots, zombies, spam using 
address spoofing, sybil attacks, dictionary attacks) 
• Allows messages (email!calls) ofiegitimate clients with no false positives 
• Doesn't cause inconvenience to a legitimate user 
• Must prevent resource misuse and hence avoid adding to the carbon foot print ofIT 
• As opposed to state-of-the-art, it must prevent spam messages of all forms (text 
messages, real-time voice calls etc) 
In order to achieve these objectives, we have proposed a mechanism which uses a 
concept of an Access Code. The proposed spam prevention mechanism has been named 
"Spam prevention using Access Code", SP AC. This combines the idea of an Access Code 
mechanism with some of the existing approaches such as white and black lists and 
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CAPTCHA [64]. However, we use these existing approaches in a different way which 
overcomes their existing drawbacks and makes them more effective) and enables SP AC 
to give far better results then the existing approaches. This is achieved by accessing the 
AC code which combines some of the existing approaches with improvements and/or 
modifications. SPAC prevents spam by using an Access Code (AC) which is required for 
sending a message (email or call) to a recipient. The AC can be easily accessed by 
legitimate clients but it is impossible or so unpleasant for sparnmers to access it that they 
give up. SP AC targets spam from two angles i.e. to preventlblock spam and to discourage 
spammers by making the infrastructure environment very unpleasant for them. Stas 
Bekman [81] reveals that the idea of discouraging the spammers was first introduced by 
Ken Simpson and Will Whittaker who founded MailChannels to solve the problem of 
spam. In addition the sparnmers will have to pay a cost in terms of time, by gaining 
information about the recipient and/or provide token as discussed later in this chapter. 
The AC code can easily be changed by the users. Changing the AC code will not affect 
the legitimate clients but will create problems for the sparnmers. 
Here we discuss the two main elements of our system. 
4.1.1 Identity (ID) 
ID is actually the unique identity or usemame of a user e.g. email address, VoIP phone 
number, telephone number or mobile phone number etc. (For convenience, here we will 
take ID for a VoIP phone number). For example the ID of Prof. Parish in the Department 
of Electronic and Electrical Engineering at Loughborough University is 01509-123456. 
In the case of email hisIDcanbeabc@lboro.ac.uk. These are open to both sparnmers 
and to legitimate clients. Anyone can search for them on the website of the University. 
This ID is unique and it can not be changed. 
4.1.2 Access Code (AC) 
This is an On' number digit which is changeable and is not open to sparnmers. In our 
experiments we used 5 digits AC codes. The AC codes are selected by the users and 
55 
maintained by a server. The AC code can be changed by the user at any time. However, 
to do so, the user needs his current AC code (relevant to his ID). 
If a sender is totally new to the recipient then he can easily access the AC from a trust 
worthy server by passing through a mechanism discussed in section 4.5. Apart from this, 
a sender/caller can also obtain the AC code directly from the recipient (i.e. the recipient 
can give his/her AC along with the ID when he/she wants to give an ID to the user or 
through alternative means e.g. if the AC for email is needed then it can be asked on the 
phone from the recipient and vice versa. It can also be accessed from friends of friends. 
Multiple users can have the same AC as the ID is unique. In order to prevent spam troll 
(dictionary attacks) for accessing the AC code, the server must have a lock out 
mechanism. It means if a user tries 3 false AC codes, the server should lock out him for a 
certain period of time which will temporarily block the caller's access. 
4.2 Spammer Vs Legitimate Client 
. From a detailed analysis of different papers and reports, we have concluded the 
following facts about a spammer and a legitimate client. 
i. A legitimate client has some knowledge about the recipient whereas a spammer 
doesn't have such knowledge. 
ii. Sybil attacks, address spoofing and dictionary attacks are the major weapons of 
spammers to evade state-of-the-art anti-spam mechanisms 
iii. Spammers send spams because the transmission cost of sending spam is almost 
zero 
iv. It is typically impossible to call a spammer back 
v. Spams are sent to thousands and millions of users within a very short time. 
Spamming can only profit a spammer if the spammer can send large number of 
emails within a short time 
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vi. The MailChannels team observed that spammers are impatient. They abort the 
connection and move on to spam other servers if they can not deliver a message 
within several seconds [81]. 
SP AC uses these differences between a spammer and a legitimate client to filter out 
spammers from the legitimate clients. The AC can be obtained at the cost of information 
about the recipient and tokens (tokens are required by spammers only and are discussed 
later in the section on charging mechanism). The mechanism provides the caller/sender 
with a challenge mechanism where information about the recipient is asked. Information 
can not be provided by the spammer. The Token mechanism (discussed in section 4.8) 
reduces the overall attempts of the spammer whereas the lockout mechanism limits the 
spammer to 3 false attempts per recipient in a particular duration of time. The SP AC 
server also contacts back the caller for entering the access code. This also reduces spam 
because in many cases, the spammers can not be contacted back. Introduction of 
Challenge mechanisms and the CAPTCHA procedures prevent bots or auto-generated 
spam which defeats the spammer on the time factor. The mechanism as a whole defeats 
the spammer in all the factors as mentioned above. We will discuss these in detail in the 
coming sections. 
4.3 Data Base of a User on the Server 
Fig 11 shows the data base of a user (say Prof. Parish) on a server A. 
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ID 
AC 
TPL 
Mujtaba 
jBPL 
Eve 
INPL 
Fig 11, data base of Prof. Parish (a VoIP user) on the server, A 
Let us briefly discuss the various functions in Fig 12. 
4.3.1 Trusted Persons List (TPL) 
This list contains ID's of those persons who have been approved by the recipient. These 
users don't need the AC code of the recipient. They simply need the recipient's ID. A 
user can add persons manually to his TPL list in which case the added users will not need 
the AC at all or a user (caller/sender) can be added to the TPL list after he/she accesses 
the AC code and make a first connection to the recipient. 
4.3.2 Blocked Persons List (BPL) 
This list maintains addresses of spammers. A user in this list can never contact the 
recipient who has blocked himlher by using the blocked address/identity. Even if he/she 
gets the correct ID and AC they can not communicate. 
The TPL and BPL lists are modified fonns of white and black lists. The state-of-the-art 
white and black lists maintain IPs, URLs or DNS names of the legitimate users and the 
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spammers respectively and they are treated globally. Ifwe assume that XYZ is a URL, IP 
or DNS name which is in the white list then it will be legitimate, for all the users of the 
email service provider (ESP) and vice versa. For this reason such white and black lists are 
subjected to false praise and address spoofing. However, the TPL and BPL lists in our 
case are relevant to each individual separately. So, a person with ID xyz may be in the 
TPL list of a user (say ABC) but he may be in the BPL list of another user (say KLM). 
This feature of treating the TPL list and the BPL list of each person separately makes 
SPAC effective against false praise and address spoofing as discussed in section 4.6. 
4.3.3 New Persons List (NPL) 
Introduction oflegitimate strangers (new legitimate clients) is really a case of concern for 
most state-of-the-art techniques (like white and black lists) which has been solved by 
SPAC. Any user who wants to send a message for the first time to a particular recipient 
will get an entry in hislher NPL. He will be added (by the receiver) either to the TPL or to 
the BPL (depending on whether he is a legitimate user or a spammer). The advantage of 
this list is in those cases where a new legitimate user is unable to get a connection to the 
recipient. Suppose, in the case ofVoIP calls, when the caller successfully obtains the AC, 
the server puts him in the NPL list of the recipient. If the connection cannot be 
established (for example if the recipient is busy) then this caller will not be required to 
repeat the whole process for obtaining the AC. He will just dial the ID. This new corner 
will remain in the NPL list until and unless the called person has changed his AC code. 
4.4 Working of the System 
In the SPAC mechanism, if a caller/sender is already been authenticated by a recipient 
then he/she would need only the ID (identity or username) of the recipient. However, if 
the client is totally new to the recipient then he/she would need to know AC (Access 
Code) of the recipient in addition to hislher ID. For the first message, the SPAC 
mechanism applies an AND operation on the ID and AC (ID and AC have been discussed 
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in section 4.1) of the recipient as shown in fig 12. This means that in order to establish a 
connection or send a message the two entities of the recipient must match. 
ID 
Recipient 
AND 
AC 
Fig 12, the basic operation of the SPAM prevention system 
A user can add a person directly to his TPL list in which case the added person doesn't 
need the AC even for hislher first contact. In the worst case, a legitimate client will need 
the AC only for the first contact with the recipient. For sending further messages (to the 
same recipient), the AC code is not needed. This provides a degree of convenience. The 
pseudo code for the SPAC application is given below: 
Notations 
The notations used in the algorithm are listed below: 
A: The trusted server on which SP AC has been installed 
S: Sender of email or caller (in VoIP) 
R: Recipient 
AC: Access Code 
ID: Identity or usemame of a user 
DB: Database 
n: Number of consecutive false attempts (by S) of anyone of the followings: 
1. Entering AC 
2. Answering questions in the challenge phase 
m: Number of tokens in the account of S 
k: Threshold level of correct answers set by R to provide AC to S 
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Module 1 
A listens for connection request(s) from users 
If 
A receives a request from S to call R 
Then 
Check R in the DB of A and Go to module 2 
Else 
Keep listening 
Module 2 
If 
R exists in the DB of A 
Then 
Go to Module 3 
Else 
Give error message to S 
Module 3 
If 
R has disabled SP AC 
Then 
Establish the connection 
Else 
Go to module 4 
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Module 4 
If 
S is in the database of R 
Then 
Go to Module 5 
Else 
Go to Module 6 
ModuleS 
If 
S is in the TPL or NPL ofR 
Then 
Establish the connection 
Else 
Reject the connection by giving an error message 
Module 6 
Ask S to enter both ID and AC of R 
If 
AC and ID ofR match 
Then 
Establish the connection 
Else 
Go to Module 7 
Module 7 
Provide the distorted text developed through CAPTCHA program 
If 
The code given in the image is entered correctly then go to Module 8 
Else 
Give another image of distorted text for entering 
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ModuleS 
If 
m>Oandn<4 
Then 
Provide questions to be answered by S and listen for the user to submit the 
answers 
Else 
Give an error message E31 
Module 9 
Event: When the user submits the answers 
If 
Number of correct answers> k 
Then 
Give AC in the form of distorted text 
Else 
Change the sequence ofthe questions and the options, and go to Module 8 
4.5 Accessing the Access Code (AC) from the server 
At the time of first contact if the sender/caller doesn't know the AC code of the recipient, 
he can access it easily from a trust worthy server by passing through a mechanism which 
involves the following steps: 
i. While making a contact, the user will first be connected to a server. If the user is a 
spammer it will be difficult for the server to contact him back 
ii.It asks the user to enter the distorted text given in an image in a given field (e.g. 
CAPTCHA code). This will filter out bots and will limit the resources of the 
spammer. 
I E3: Ifm < I, then E3 ~ You do not have enough tokens in your account 
Ifn > 3, You have made 3 false attempts. Please try again later 
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iii.lt asks the user for specific information about the recipient. Here the spammer will 
fail. Third party such as pom website viewers (as discussed in section 3.5.4) will also 
not be able to fulfil this job for the spammer. A sample of such questions is shown in 
Figure 28. 
iv.The lock out mechanism will put a limit on the number of false attempts made by the 
spammer. Also the sequence of questions and their multiple choices (answers) as 
shown in Figure 28 changes on each new attempt which adds to the inconvenience for 
the spammer. 
v.The multiple choice answers and the final AC code on passing all 'the steps is also 
given in the form of distorted texts in the image to make it more immune to bots. 
vi. The spammer will receive charges for each spam (section 4.8 on the charging 
mechanism) 
vii.Even if a spammer has overcome the above issues then he will not be able to send 
multiple spams in parallel to a number of recipients because information regarding 
each person is different and random. So, he can only provide information and AC 
codes in series. This will not be efficient for him (see facts 3, 5 and 6 in section 4.2). 
In addition the use of the CAPTCHA program and providing access code in the form 
of distorted text in an image further prevents the chances of auto-generated spam 
(bots). 
4.6 Different Case Studies 
Now we consider the response of the system for different cases. We imagine that the 
recipient (of emails) in our case studies is Prof. David J Parish who is in the Department 
of Electronic and Electrical Engineering at Loughborough University, UK. For the sake 
of simplicity we are considering spam in emaiI in these case studies. Similar cases can be 
used for spam in VoIP (SPIT). The emaiI address of Prof. Parish (say 
d.j.parish@lboro.ac.uk) is represented by the ID in these cases. A user while sending an 
email to Prof. Parish can come across anyone of the following cases: 
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1. An email can be from a legitimate person who is in regular contact with Prof. 
Parish 
2. The sender of the email can be a legitimate client who is a stranger to Prof. Parish 
3. The sender could be a sparnrner who has no knowledge about the AC of Prof. 
Parish 
4. A sparnrner with knowledge of the AC code of Prof. Parish who would like to 
send him an email 
5. The sender could be a sparnrner who is already in the BPL list 
6. A sparnrner might want to send spam emails to Prof. Parish with changed identity 
(Sybil Attacks) 
7. A spanuner may want to send an email to Prof. Parish using a spoofed address 
Case I-Approved Caller 
In this case the user doesn't need to pass through the challenge step (collecting 
information about the recipient). We consider Yaqoob who is a student of Prof. Parish in . 
the High Speed Networks (HSN) research group at Loughborough University, UK. When 
Yaqoob is given the ID of Prof. Parish, he is also given his AC code. For the first time 
Yaqoob will use the AC to send an email to the recipient. After that Prof. Parish would 
add the sender (i.e. Yaqoob) to his TPL list. Prof. Parish can also add the ID of Yaqoob 
manually (directly) into his TPL list in which case Yaqoob would never need the AC of 
Prof. Parish. Once Yaqoob is added to the TPL list of Prof. Parish (either manually or by 
using AC for the first call), he would not need the AC code for any future calls to Prof. 
Parish because he has been approved by Prof. Parish. The following figure shows that 
any person in the TPL list (in this case Yaqoob) would need only the ID of the recipient 
(here Prof. Parish) to contact him. 
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Yaqoob 
ID. 
d.j.pal'ish@lbol'o.ac.uk 
AC=23456 
~ U 
El ~ 
D 
Prof Pallish 
Fig 13, A sender in the TPL list requires only email ID 
Case 2 - Legitimate Stranger 
Khalil is a new student and he wants to contact Prof. Parish. On the university website 
Khalil searched for the email address (ID) of Prof. Parish. The figure below shows that 
Khalil is in none of the lists of Prof. Parish. This means that he needs the AC code. 
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d.j. parish@Jboro.ac.uk 
AC = 234'\6 
- -
Khalil TPL jyaqoob 
ID IBPL 
• !Eve 
AC? ~L 
Fig 14, Khalil (a legitimate stranger) needs AC 
In order to obtain the AC from the server, Khalil will need to pass the different steps as 
mentioned in section 4.5. These steps are shown in Figure 15: 
67 
Sender Selver Recipient 
ID 
Processing 
~ AC? 
Enter Code* 
Code Entered 
~ 
Questions 
Answers 
~ 
AC 
AC 
. Connection established 
• .
Update Database 
Fig 15, accessing the AC from the server by a legitimate client 
*CAPTCHA code 
Khalil is contacted by the server, the server first checks if Khalil is in any of the three 
lists. The server finds that Khalil is in nom:: of the lists. Now the server calls Khalil back 
and asks him to enter the AC code of Prof. Parish but Khalil doesn't know the AC. (A 
spammer can not be called back as mentioned in section 4.2, fact no iv). The server 
realizes that Khalil is unknown to Prof. Parish and he wants to send an email to Prof. 
Parish. The AC will be given to Khalil by passing the following steps: 
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1. In order to confirm that the request is not a bot (auto-generated spam), the server 
asks the sender to enter a distorted text (given in an image) in a field as shown in 
Figure 16. This is achieved by using a CAPTCHA Program [64]. 
the two words: m1e ~:m . IIIICAPTCHA'" 
EVnO· ·1 stop apllm. ~ reaa books. 
Fig 16, example of CA PT CH A procedures [64] 
2. The server will ask Khalil some questions regarding Prof. Parish, such as his full 
name, department, university etc. If Khalil gives the correct information then he 
will be provided with the correct AC. Khalil can provide this information because 
he has found it on the university website. 
Note: A spammer would not have such information about Prof. Parish (See Fact 
no: 1) or it will be costly to obtain. 
3. By charging Khalil one token for this service. (Please see the charging mechanism 
section). Now it's clear that Khalil is not a sparnmer. Ifhe was a spammer then: 
• It would not be possible for the server to contact him back 
• He would not be able to provide information about Prof. Parish 
• The AC number is going to be lost the moment he sends a SP AM so he 
would not spend token and time to access it. Spamming could not profit 
himlher. 
When Khalil sends the email, he is listed in the NPL of Prof. Parish. Since Khalil is not a 
spammer, Prof. Parish will not add him to the BPL list. If the sender were a sparnmer 
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then adding himlher to the BPL list would cost the sender 1 token. Prof. Parish can either 
add him into his TPL list or he can leave him in the NPL list. 
• If Khalil is added into his TPL list then the token is returned into his account and 
for future contacts he would be treated as a sender in Case 1. 
• If Khalil is left in the NPL list then until Prof. Parish changes his AC, he will not 
need the AC code for future emails. But if Prof. Parish changes his AC then 
Khalil will need to repeat all the steps of Case 2 to obtain the new AC. 
Case 3 - Dictionary Attack 
Here the sender is a spammer who wants to send a spam to Prof. Parish by randomly 
selecting or guessing the email address of a user (the spam troll/dictionary attack). The 
spammer's address is in none of the lists of Prof. Parish. So, the server will function as 
for an unknown person (or stranger). The sparnmer will totally fail because he needs the 
AC code for which he needs to pass all the steps as discussed in Case 2. This means that 
our mechanism is totally effective against spam troll/dictionary attacks. 
Case 4 - Spammer who accesses the A C 
In this case a spammer (say Mev) accesses the AC of Prof. Parish by fulfilling all the 
requirements of the server which involves call back, time, information about the recipient 
and cost. 
Note: It will be very difficult (if not impossible) for the spammer to fulfill all these 
requirements. At the same time spamming in such a case would not profit the spammer. 
But we consider a worst case in which a spammer accesses the A C. 
The figure below shows that Mev is in none of the lists of Prof. Parish. 
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Ivfev 
ID 
d.j. p a rislt@lhol"O.ac.nk 
AC= 23456 
PL 
-"({OOb 
Chalil 
PL 
Fig 17, Mev, the spammer can't be connected to Prof. Parish 
When Mev sends an email to Prof. Parish, she remains in the NPL list of Prof. Parish who 
is going to put her in his BPL list after concluding that Mev is a spamrner (as shown in 
fig 19). At the same time Prof. Parish will also change his AC. In order to send a spam to 
Prof. Parish again, the spamrner would need to repeat all the steps as discussed in Case 2 
and at the cost of one token. This would defeat the spamrner on time, tokens, patience and 
the loss of his spamming business. In fact it would be impossible for the spamrner to send 
emails in bulk. He/she would not be able to get the financial gain that is expected from 
the spam business. Thus the infrastructure environment has been made so unpleasant for 
the spamrner that he gives up. 
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Case 5 - Spammer in the BPL list 
In this case a spammer (say Eve) who is already in the BPL list of Prof. Parish wants to 
send an email to Prof. Parish. The server finds that he is in the BPL list so it will simply . 
respond to her with a sorry message. 
Case 6 - Sybi/ Attack 
Here Eve, the spammer wants to change her identity (Sybil Attack). For example instead 
of eve@domain.com she wants to use the ID of Mark (mark@domain.com) represented 
by Mark in the figure below. 
IVlark 
ID 
AC? 
(l.j·l)al'ish@lbol'o.ac.uk 
AC = 23456 
TPL 
Yaqoob 
':{halil 
PL 
L 
Fig 18, In case of Sybil attack the server functions as for unknown person 
In such a case the server would function as for unknown person and she will need to 
contact server A for the AC of Prof. Parish. The server would function as for case 2. 
72 
Case 7 - Address Spoofing 
In the presence of SP AC, address spoofing can not help the spammer because even with 
address spoofing, the SPAC server functions as for unknown persons (Case 2). Our 
proposed mechanism provides three levels of resistance against address spoofing. We 
consider two situations of address spoofing: 
• Spoofing the address of a person who is not in the TPL list of the callee 
• Spoofing the address of a person who is in the TPL list of the callee 
a) Spoofed Address not in the TPL List: 
In this case, the spitter wants to use the address of a random person (say Mark) who is in 
none of the lists of Prof. Parish. The server will function as for case 2 as shown in Figure 
19. 
(l.j.parish@lboro.ac.uk 
AC= 234"6 
-
Mark TPL 
Yaqoob 
{halil 
ID BPL 
• Eve 
AC? NPL 
Fig 19, spoofing address of a random person does not help the spammer 
The spammer will need to pass all the steps. In the presence ofSPAC, this case of address 
spoofing can not help the spammer. 
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b) Spoofed Address in the TPL List: 
Spoofing the address of some other person (say XYZ) the spitter must be certain that the 
person XYZ is in the TPL list of the recipient(s). It is impossible for the spammer to find 
who is in the TPL list of a certain person unless they hack the server or the host. In 
addition it is not probable that the same person (XYZ) would be in the TPL list of all the 
recipients as shown in the figure below (for simplicity we have shown databases of only 3 
persons. Spamming can be profitable only if spammers can send spam to a huge number 
of persons because only a very small percentage of that huge number respond to spam as 
discussed in Chapter 2. So, in practice we believe that spammers must be certain that the 
spoofed address is in the TPL list for thousands and millions of recipients). 
K1talil 
ID 
TPL 
Yaqoob 
(halil 
[]
L 
ve 
Iev 
[] 
Prof. Pmish 
~PL 
lFayaz 
IShah 
D ev 
[] 
Aklttar 
TPL 
Ammar 
Akhtar 
Kev D 
[] 
Umais 
Fig 20, spoofing address of a person in the TPL list 
Consider the case where a spammer gets knowledge about the TPL list of a recipient (say 
Prof. Parish). Spoofing the address of a person who is in the TPL list of the recipient can 
give little or no help to the spammer. For example, in Figure 20, a spammer spoofs the 
address of Khalil. But with this address, he would be able to send unwanted email only to 
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Prof. Parish. He would not be able to send unwanted emaiI to Akhtar or Umais because 
KhaIil is not in the TPL list of Akhtar or Umais. So, we conclude that in the case of 
address spoofing, the sparnmer would only be able to send unwanted emaiI to that 
particular recipient whose TPL list contains the spoofed address (again at the cost of time, 
patience, tokens and information about the recipient). The sparnmer would not be able to 
send spams to different recipients. 
SP AC can be further strengthened against address spoofing by using a simple 
authentication mechanism. With SP AC we can introduce a very simple cryptographic 
authentication mechanism i.e. by encrypting the ID with the AC. This will help in 
reducing the chances of spoofing. For example while making a call, the server first 
authenticates the caller by asking himlher to give his AC. This encrypts his ID with his 
AC and sends the cyphertext to the server. The server already has the ID and AC of the 
caller/sender in its database. It encrypts the ID of the caller/sender with his access code 
and compares the two cyphertexts. After authenticating, the local server will carry out the 
other steps. However, it should be noted that this authentication mechanism is not a part 
of this research; rather it is a related area of research. We mentioned it here to show that 
SPAC provides an easy mechanism for senderlcaller authentication. 
4.7 Charging Mechanism 
One of the main reasons for spam is the fact that the cost of sending spam messages is 
almost zero. At the same time the key reason for intemet popularity is that it is almost 
free. If we control the cost factor such that it is free for the legitimate clients but not for 
the spammers then this can help in creating problems for the spammers without creating 
any difficulty for the legitimate clients. Previously payment methods have been suggested 
which have been discussed in detail in section 3.5.1. The charging mechanism in our 
proposed mechanism overcomes the drawbacks/limitations of those proposed 
mechanisms. In our mechanism an allocation of free tokens per month are provided to 
every user. One token is subtracted from the sender's/caller's account whenever he/she 
accesses the server for the AC code of a new recipient. The token is returned to his/her 
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account when the recipient decides that he/she is not a spanuner. In chapter 6 (section 
6.2) we will discuss the outcomes of a survey for fixing the number of free tokens for 
each user. We concluded that 100 tokens per user per month was a reasonable starting 
point. These tokens are enough for a legitimate caller but not nearly sufficient for a 
spanuner. The reason is that the free tokens are returned to legitimate callers/senders and 
they don't usually send bulk emails. However, spammers send a large number of spams 
and they will not be returned the tokens (based on the feedback by the recipient that 
he/she is a spanuner). 
Note: The charging mechanism will work only if a global charge structure is introduced. 
4.8 Summary 
An anti-spam mechanism referred to as "Spam Prevention using Access Code", SPAC 
has been proposed to prevent spam. In addition to the ID of the recipient, SP AC requires 
an Access Code (AC) for sending a message (email or call) to a recipient. SPAC 
functions equally well for dictionary attacks (spam troll), sybil attacks, address spoofing 
etc. The AC can be easily accessed by legitimate clients but it is impossible or 
significantly unpleasant for the spammers to access it. SPAC targets spam from two 
angles i.e. to preventlblock spam and to discourage spanuners by making the 
infrastructure environment very unpleasant for them. For the first time call from a sender, 
SP AC treats all these cases as stranger sender/caller and asks for the AC code in addition 
to the ID which can be obtained by passing through the challenge and charging 
mechanism ofSPAC. Detailed analysis of the results obtained from the tests on the SPAC 
application (as discussed in chapter 6) and a study of the characteristics of the spammer 
and a legitimate user show that the challenge and charging mechanisms provided by 
SPAC are very difficult, unpleasant and costly for the spanuner. SPAC provides the user 
with a degree of convenience because legitimate trusted users will not need the AC code. 
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5 The SPAC Application 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to test the SPAC mechanism as discussed in the previous chapter, we have 
developed a SPAC application. The software application is similar in function to a chat 
messenger. The application has been developed such that it can be used to perform tests 
for preventing both types of spams (SPIT and spam in email) under consideration in this 
thesis. The application was developed using PHP (Hypertext Preprocessor) as our 
scripting language and MySql as our database management system. Dreamweaver was 
used as a web development application. Dreamweaver, PHP and MySql have been 
introduced in Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C respectively (given at the end of 
this thesis). 
This chapter describes the working of the SP AC application and introduces the different 
features of the SPAC mechanism (with snapshots) discussed in chapter 4 and 
explanations of the different functions of the SP AC application. The application has been 
developed such that it can be used to test the ability of the SPAC mechanism to prevent 
SPIT and spam emails which are the 2 major types of spams under consideration in this 
research. The results we obtained from our different tests are given in the following 
chapter. 
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5.2 Flow Chart 
Figure 21 shows the flow chart of the SPAC application. 
Fig 21, Flow chart of the SPAC application 
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5.3 The SPAC Application 
Below we discuss the software application and how it is used. 
5.3.1 Accessing the SP AC home page: 
We consider that the "spac" folder (which contains all the necessary files and database of 
the SP AC application) is located on a server named "Akhtar" on the local network. The 
spac server can be accessed from any pc on the local network via a web browser. A web 
browser is opened and the URL http://akhtar/spac/index.php . or 
http://IPaddressoftheserver/spac/index.php entered. (where "IPaddressoftheserver" is the 
IP address of the server on which the spac folder is present). This opens the main home 
page of the SP AC application which gives the main menu as shown in Figure. 22: 
SBAM BREViENT:ION USING 
._. e," '.. ~ ,',_ ,,~' ., __ ~ ,''''' _' ~ ,"" ".J •• y/ __ " .'.' _ ,,", 
A<::<::ESS 60DE 
* -' ,,,", __ -" ,J ~., ,J _I ~_. 
~lJB§~~Is.,§£lljl1.'(r: f,!~J?I;\ g~~tQ,JJ ~~.Rts.,blJ 
Main Menu 
1. Register 
2. Login 
3. Third Party Application I View Request 
4. Off SPAC Messages 
5. Auto Spam Test 
Fig 22, Home page of the SPAC application 
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The main menu on the SPAC home page shows five options. We discuss the function of 
each option. 
5.3.2 Register 
Clicking on this link will provide the registration form as given below: 
User Registration 
Email 
Phone 
Master Access code 
Child Access Code 1 
Child Access Code 2 
User ID 
Password 
Confirm Password: 
Secrete Questioll .• 
SPAC 
. Confirm pas sword 
. (£l Enable . 0 Dis~ble. 
I Submit I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
J 
Internet 
Fig 23, Registration page 
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At the bottom of the registration form, if the user has selected the "Enable" option, the 
caller/sender would need to pass through the SPAC mechanism in order to contact this 
user. If this option is disabled then the recipient is contacted and the SPAC mechanism is 
not used. A recipient with SPAC disabled will receive messages just as he would in a 
standard emaiI system. In other words we could say that by disabling the SP AC, the user 
doesn't mind receiving any spam messages. There exist a large number of Internet users 
who want to receive advertising, jokes, messages about surveys and/or political 
messages. In the current opt-in and opt-out procedures the control is in the hands of the 
sending organisations and companies due to which the users have to first understand and 
then pass through the opt-out mechanism of each organisation. Also he/she receives spam 
from unknown organisations. This feature of the SP AC mechanism gives control to the 
users. He/she can simply enable or disable the SPAC. In other words a user can simply 
disable or enable (respectively) the delivery of spam messages into his account. 
5.3.3 Login 
A registered user can login to the SP AC application using an option on the home page. 
After pressing the login the user needs to give hislher username and password in the 
following window: 
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I Submit I 
Close Window [Xl 
Fig 24, Login Window 
After giving the correct usemame and password the client gets the following welcome 
window which is used to activate the SP AC application. 
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TPL (Trusted Person's List) 
I<ostas .I:kostas) ,!I. [0] 
Fayaz (23232323)& [0] 
BPL (Blocked Person's List) 
Saq; [kh) , ..... [0] 
NPL (New Person's List) 
CallI Send 
Ciid: here 
Fig 25, welcome window 
Figure 25 shows the welcome window for a user named "Akhtar Khalil" which is 
displayed in the welcome message, 
The figure shows that the TPL list of the user has two users: 
Kostas with ID "kostas" 
Fayaz with ID "23232323" 
These two users can send messages to "Akhtar Khalil" without the need of his AC, 
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The BPL list of the Akhtar Khalil contains one user which is Saqi with the usr ID "kk". 
kk can never send messages to Akhtar Khalil because Akhtar Khalil has blocked him. 
The NPL list maintains addresses of the new callers/senders. When a caller/sender 
obtains the AC and would like to make his first call to the recipient then his ID for the 
first message would be placed into the NPL list of the recipient. The advantage of this list 
is that if a legitimate user obtains the AC (by passing all the steps of SPAC) but couldn't 
contact the recipient for some reason (for example if a recipient has another call or is 
busy and can not attend the call) then for the next try the recipient would not need to 
repeat all the previous steps. From the NPL list a recipient can shift the caller/sender to 
his TPL or BPL list. 
In order to send a message to Kostas or Fayaz, Akhtar Khalil can directly click on Kostas 
or Fayaz. To send a message to a new person say I1yas with username/ID "87878787" 
(I1yas in this case is a registered SPAC user), Akhtar Khalil needs to click on the "Click 
here"link in Call/ Send giving the window shown in Figure 26. 
http://localhost/spac/npl ,php ?org_uid=O 
(-- Please Enter Access Code--------------l 
I I 
I 
User ID 
Access Code 
. Check 
Fig 26, A calIer needs ID and AC of the recipient for the first contact 
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Akhtar gives the usemame (or ID) of Ilyas but he also needs to give the access code as 
well because Akhtar is not in any of the Ilyas's lists. If a caIler/sender makes 3 false 
attempts in providing AC (e.g. if a caller/sender enters a wrong AC code 3 times) then the 
server locks him out for a certain period of time (1 minute in our test case) as shown in 
Figure 27. 
i'\. You have tried 3 false attempts. please try again later. 
t • 
OK 
Fig 27, message received after making 3 false attempts of AC code 
This feature is used to restrict the number of attempts by a spammer. If Ilyas has not 
given his access code to Akhtar then Akhtar can access the code from the server. For this 
he clicks on the "check" button. As he clicks on the check button the server will first 
check if he has a token in his account. If yes then the server will provide him with some 
distorted text by using the CAPTCHA program as shown in Figure 7. 
The reason for this distorted text in the image is to filter out bots from human users. 
(Note: In the experimental SPAC application we have not used the CAPTCHA program 
because the development of this program is not a part of this thesis. However it is a well 
koown mechanism to prevent bots). We have used CAPTCHA with the proposed 
mechanism to provide further resistance against bats. Information about each recipient is 
random which will also stop automated spam including spams generated by human 
beings but combination with CAPTCHA program will further strengthen it against bots. 
After entering the correct text as given in the distorted text in the image, Akhtar 
(caller/sender) is provided with the following questions about Ilyas (the recipient). 
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@ro obtain accesscode answer the 
following' 
What is rm' country name? 
o Germany 
o Spain 
o UK 
o France 
What is rm' name? 
o Shafi 
o I~fas 
o Jamil 
o Fahim 
What is rm' profession? 
o Business 
o A.dministration 
o Research 
o Teaching 
What is my department? 
o Mechanical 
o Computer science 
o Civil 
o Electrical 
Submit I 
Fig 28, challenge step's questions presented to the caller/sender for obtaining AC of 
the recipient 
If the caller/sender gives correct answers to the questions provided, he will receive the 
AC of the recipient. It is worth mentioning that the order of questions and the order of 
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possible answers for a particular recipient (Ilyas in this case) is changed by the server 
every time the server displays questions. A lock out mechanism has been introduced here. 
If a user makes 3 false attempts then he/she is locked out for a certain period of time (say 
1 minute). After submitting the correct information about Ilyas, the application gives the 
message shown in Figure 29. 
The access code for 
user: 87878787 is :45454 
You have been charged one token 
for this sen~ce Go back and enter 
usemame and accesscode 
Fig 29, Access Code provided after passing the challenge step 
Clicking on the Go back link takes the user to the following frame again: 
Please Enter Access 
User ID 
Access Code 
Fig 30, caller/sender needs to re-enter the AC 
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Now the user can give the AC code for the recipient. Submitting this information will add 
the caller/sender to the NPL list of the recipient (Ilyas). Akhtar is given the following 
message shown in Figure: 
http://localhost/spac/npl. php?org_uid=O 
r~ Please Enter Access Ccder-~-~~~" 
I User Name 
Access 
Code 145454 I L __ .~~ __ -.-J 
I Check I 
@Access Code For User: 87878787 
is Correct. 
You have ceen added into the new 
persons' list (NPL) of the recipient. 
You can now send messages to the 
recipient. 
Fig 31, message showing that the caller/sender is added in the NPL list ofthe 
recipient 
Now Akhtar can send messages to Ilyas. Here Akhtar sends a message, "Hello! Ilyas" to 
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Ilyas. We now see the account of Ilyas. Figure 32 shows the welcome window of Ilyas 
(the recipient): 
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You have 100 token left in your account 
TPL (Trusted Person's List) 
BPL (Blocked Person's List) 
Kostas (kostas) ,'So [0] 
NPL (t'lew Person's List) 
(09123'::55) ,'So [0] 0 (1) 
CallI Send 
r-':li"',lt ;'Icro 
'-" , ... \ , ... "" 
Fig 32, welcome window of I1yas (the recipient) 
The figure shows that he has received one message from the user ID "09123456" which 
is the ID of Akhtar Khalil. Ilyas can read this message and can update his database by 
shifting Akhtar to his TPL list (if Akhtar is not a spamrner). 
Options 
The options link is given on the main welcome window (as in figure 33). It gives options 
as shown in the Figure 33: 
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date Profile 
Enable I Disable SPAC 
'lJP~at~,Ac~ess Code, , 
Update Password 
Add apers~n. 
M.a!l~Q~ ~~r~~.~ ~~~! 
! Threshold ",:>U'UU,:,:' 
Questions;!':' "ltinn,,:! 
YaqClob {22334455) [0] 
Kostas (\;08ta8).'!,. [DJ 
\I Ray (ray) ".1> [DJ 
BPL (Blocked Person's List) 
(8',8) :~ [OJ 
(sarrnad) .l. [DJ 
NPL (New Person's List) 
CallI Send 
Click Ime 
Fig 33, option menu in the welcome window 
We discuss these options briefly: 
Update Profile 
Used to update the profile of a user 
Enable / Disable SPA C 
Used to enable or disable the SPAC mechanism 
Update Access Code 
This is used to change the Access Code(s), There are 3 types of Access Codes: 
i. Master Access Code - the normal access code as discussed earlier 
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ii. Child Access Code( s) - Access code( s) used on a temporary basis. Its importance is 
manifested in section 6.4 on Third Party Applications. 
Update Password 
Used to change the password 
Add a person 
This is used to add a person manually to any of the three lists. So, if a user (say David) 
adds Akhtar to his TPL list then Akhtar would not need the AC of David even for his first 
contact with David. 
Manage Person list 
Used to give names to different !Ds and shifts persons from one list to another 
Threshold Level 
Used to change the threshold level of correct answers to be given for obtaining the correct 
AC code from the server. A threshold level of 3 means that a caller must provide correct 
answers to at least 3 questions regarding the recipient in order to obtain his/her access 
code (AC). 
Questions' Settings 
Used to add, delete or edit questions and answers· 
Note: It should be noted that the remaining options (Option 3, 4 and 5) of the SPAC 
home page are not related directly to the SPAC mechanism. However they have been 
developed to simulate and test the efficiency of the SP AC system in different practical 
scenarios. 
5.3.4 Extension for Third Party Application I View Request 
This option on the home page of the SPAC application is used as a third party application 
in order to create a simulation of an e-commerce web site (e.g. e-bay). For example 
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David wants to sell his laptop, so he posted the following message on an onIine auction 
website or some other site (e.g. his university site for "Sale and Wanted"): 
Put Your Request 
User ID: 123456 
Accesscode: 176543 
~=========---------~ Message: Hello, P4 Laptop (T/lith one year ',larIanty) fo:: 
sale. 
Submit 
Fig 34, example of a message to be posted on an e-commerce website 
It is clear that any user can easily contact him. It should be noticed that here David has 
given a secondary AC code (or a child AC code) which is used for display in public 
places and can be changed frequently. Actually this means that until David has sold his 
laptop, he will receive emails/calls from others (both spammers and legitimate users). 
The callers/senders (related to the purchase of the laptop) would be using his secondary 
code to access him. But as soon as David sells the laptop and he wants no more calls 
about it, he would change his secondary AC code or will deactivate it and with this 
callers would not be able to access him rather they would need to pass through the 
challenge mechanism as discussed earlier. This will also indicate all respondents that the 
author of the message is no longer interested in selling his laptop or he has sold it. This 
again benefits the seller. Instead of receiving a number of calls after sale, he could simply 
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change his secondary access code to infonn all the callers that the laptop is no more 
available. 
The "View Request" link can be used to view the requests posted by different users. This 
is a simulation of viewing the online e-comrnerce website. For example the message 
posted by David above using the Third Party Application could be viewed by users as: 
Third Application Request! 
I User ID I Access Code I Message· 
122456 176543 I Heno, P4 Laptop (with one year warranty) for :aie. 
r 23456-187654 Nokia N95 wanted Expected range £300 to £350. 
87878787~ I I want to sell my BMW car for £5000. 
Ikostas .•.. 188888 I Iwould like to sell ':lY :\Iac for £400 .•. 
< ..•. 
Fig 35, simulation of an onUne e-commerce website 
5.3.5 OfrSPAC Messages 
This link is used to send messages to any user of SPAC message. It is a simulation of 
other applications (e.g. hotmail, yahoo, Skype etc). It is used in relation to the previous 
link for "Third Party Applications". For example a user after seeing a message from the 
view request link is interested in buying David's Laptop. By clicking on the "Off SPAC 
Messages" link, the user is provided with the window shown in Figure 36: 
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Third ParlyAI>I)licalion 
User ID 
Accesscode 
Submit 
Fig 36, window for sending Off-SP AC messages to a user 
The customer can easily access David's ID and his secondary AC code (from Fig 36) in 
order to send him a message which is received in his account as shown by the "New 
Messages" link in his Welcome Window; see Figure 37. 
TPL (Trusted Person's List) 
BPL (Blocked Person's List) 
f:[lstas l:kostas).!> [0] 
NPL (New Person's List) 
. (09123456),~ [0] (1) 
Calli Send 
C!i::k here 
Fig 37, the recipient's welcome window showing new messages 
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5.3.6 Auto Spam Test 
This link is used in the SP AC application home page to test the bots scenario. When the 
"Auto Spam Test" link is clicked, the application picks up users from a database to send 
them emails as shown in figure: 
"C"sernrune 
)'-1essage 
~ E J 
~ li_. ___ =.J 
~ !kk ~ 
~ ~-'---.---J 
[h..~~~.~!!:......_ ..... _ ......... ] 
[sadlq-' ~ 
[k~~.~!~r:'1...._........... .. _J 
, 
I kostas __ J 
r:;.-.------.. ] 
I nz 
----------_ .. _-----
[23232323 ] 
@912345~ __ -=:=~~J 
[87i73737-···················] 
[4-s:&7:iSiil-----·] 
~ellQ! To help you enjoy ycur 
summer holidays, XYZ Airlines is 
offering 90% di3co~nt en allot 
its International flights. Apply 
online on WHit. x)'z. cam. Offer runs 
till end of July. 
I Submit I 
Fig 38, example of an auto-spa m test 
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As soon as the spammer wants to send spam messages, all the messages come across the 
first step of the SPAC mechanism that is the CAPTCHA procedures (as shown in Figure 
39) where the bats will fail. 
I:san_ 
21 Enter the text giren in tl~ image ~ 
21 Enter the text giren in ~ image "Nte\~ 
21 Enter the text giren in ~ image ~ 
21 Enter the text given in the image ~ 
21 f-----i Enter the text given in ~ ima.ae ~ 
0 Enter the text giren in the image ~ 
0 Ihuss.in Enter the text given in the image ~ 
21 Ikhalil Enter the text giren in the image ~ 
Fig 39, example of the hindrances provided by SP AC for bots 
This step will filter out the bats from the human users. Again human spammers or 
machines/computers (used by a spammer in a bot attack) do not know the Access Code 
(AC) for these users, so they would fail. The only way to access the AC from the server is 
to pass all the steps of the SPAC mechanism as discussed in section 4.6 which is possible 
neither for zombies (infected machines controlled by spammers to send bats) nor for the 
human spammers. 
5.4 Summary 
An application has been developed to test the performance of the SP AC mechanism, the 
"SPAC application". This allows the user to register, login and send messages to different 
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j 
users. Users can also update/edit their databases (including their passwords, questions, 
profile, Access Code(s), manage lists, and enable/disable SPAC). The SPAC application 
also provides a mechanism to test the proposed mechanism against bots and to support 
third-party activities. The SP AC application has all the features of the SP AC mechanism. 
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6 Experiments and Results 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on evaluating the perfonnance of the SPAC mechanism. For this 
various tests were perfonned on the previously discussed SPAC application. The aim of 
these tests was to evaluate the perfonnance of the SPAC mechanism. The SPAC 
mechanism was tested both for spam messages and also for legitimate messages. In these 
tests we assumed that if a sender wanted to send message(s) to recipient(s) without any 
valid reason then it would be considered as a spam message and if a sender wanted to 
send message(s) to recipient(s) with some valid reason then it would be considered as a 
legitimate message. We also considered bots where a sender is interested in sending auto-
generated spam. Initially we identify the number of free tokens for the charging 
mechanism. 20 people participated in these tests whereby people on different computers 
on a LAN were asked to access the SPAC application from the SPAC server (the laptop 
on which the SPAC application was installed). Each participant perfonned a total of 55 
tests. The distribution of the tests was such that each participant acted as a legitimate 
sender in 10 tests (5 for legitimate strangers and 5 for approved legitimate senders) and as 
a spammer in 45 tests (5 as a stranger, 5 as a spammer who is blocked and 35 as 
simulated bots). We perfonned a total of 1100 tests. Out of these tests, the senders acted 
as spammers in 900 tests and as legitimate users in 200 tests. Out of the 900 spam tests, 
700 were simulated bots (auto-spam) tests. We found interesting results and features of 
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the SP AC mechanism. The results obtained showed that SP AC has a clear edge over the 
existing anti-spam technological approaches. In the following sections we discuss the 
number of free tokens that we selected for our tests and the results obtained from the 
practical tests on the SP AC mechanism. 
6.2 Number of free tokens 
We discussed the token charging mechanism in section 4.8. In order to decide the number 
of free tokens for the charging mechanism, we carried out a survey on 100 phone users to 
determine an acceptable number of free tokens. Figure 5 shows the number of calls that 
100 phone users made to new persons in one month. 
Calls (per Month) to New Persons 
50 
45 j 40 35 30 
j 2' ~ [;v\ \ Wv.lfVNv 20 B "~ ~ 10 II , I"", 
0 
1 , 17 25 33 41 49 57 65 73 81 89 97 
Users 
Fig 40, number of calls made to new persons 
We assume a similar number for email users. The graph shows that a normal user calls 4 
to 10 new persons in one month. Persons dealing in some businesses contacted 25 to 45 
new persons per month. In addition to that free tokens are also returned to legitimate 
callers. From the graph we can clearly observe that 100 tokens per week are enough for a 
legitimate caller but not sufficient for a sparnmer because of his interest in generating a 
large number of spams where the token will not be returned (based on the feedback by 
the recipient that he/she is a spammer). It should be noticed that this survey is a very 
informal survey and is meant only for understanding the charging mechanism. However a 
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detailed study (by a certain ESP or VoIP service provider) of the number of emails/calls 
to new persons is needed to fix accurately the number of these free tokens. 
6.3 Results of different tests 
In our tests we considered both legitimate messages and spam messages. Whenever a 
sender wanted to send a message to a recipient with valid reason, it was considered to be 
a legitimate message. If the sender wanted to send messages to the recipients without any 
reason and without any knowledge about the recipient, the messages were assumed as 
spam messages. The sections below discuss the results obtained from the different tests 
on the SP AC application. 
Legitimate stranger (first time contact) 
The details of this case have been discussed in section 4.7 (Case 2). In the very first test 
for the legitimate users, the sender (Kostas) was acting as legitimate user to send a 
message to a recipient (David). He was provided with the ID of David (23456) and was 
asked to send a message to David. David could give his AC code along with the ID to 
Kostas. But this test was meant to check if Kostas can obtain AC code from the server. 
Kostas came across the following questions about David. 
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'Nhat is my profession? 
o Engineering 
o Arts 
o Business 
o I.'edicine 
What is my university? 
0 Leicester 
0 UCL 
0 Loughborough 
0 I,'anchester 
W'hat is my name? 
o John 
o lan 
o I.'ark 
o David 
'Nhat is my location? 
o Germany 
o Australia 
o UK 
o Spain 
"',hat is my Gender? 
o Female 
o Dont know 
o Dont know 
o Male 
s~ b'~rlit' I 
Fig 41, challenge step to get AC of David 
Kostas could easily answer these questions because he knows David and in this case 
Kostas was a legitimate user. Kostas successfully obtained the AC code from the server 
which was used for sending a message to David, David added Kostas to his TPL list and 
Kostas didn't need the AC code for any future messages. We perfonned 100 such tests to 
check the perfonnance of the system for the legitimate messages and none of them 
showed any false positives. 
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Approved (Trusted) Caller 
Case 1 of section 4.7 (chapter 4) discusses the approved caller. We perfonned 100 tests 
where different users added different persons manually in their TPL lists. The persons in 
the TPL list could call the recipients without any need for the AC code. This category 
also included cases in which the sender is provided with both the ID and AC code of the 
recipient. The system showed no false positive in this case. 
The following graph shows the perfonnance of the SPAC application for legitimate 
messages. 
Legitimate Messages 
250 
t 
200 
150 ID Sent 
'll 100 ID Delivered ! 50 
0 
Messages 
Fig 42, graph showing the performance of SPAC for legitimate messages 
The graph above shows that when using the SPAC application all the legitimate messages 
were delivered with zero false positives. This means that SPAC mechanism doesn't 
impact the distribution oflegitimate messages. 
Spammer (Stranger) 
We perfonned 100 tests in which the sender acted as a spammer. These tests included 
sybil attacks, dictionary attacks and address spoofing. An example of the first spam test 
that we carried out is as follows: 
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In this test the participant (say Mujtaba) wanted to send a message to a stranger XYZ. In 
this test Mujtaba was acting as a spammer because he wanted to send a message to XYZ 
without any reason and he has no knowledge about XYZ. After passing the CAPTCHA 
procedure, he came across the following questions: 
What is my profession? 
o Academics 
o Business 
o Drr.'ing 
o t.'anagement 
\Nhat is my organisation? 
o DERA 
o ERA 
OPERA 
o ESPRC 
What is my country name? 
o Germany 
o Spain 
o UK 
o France 
What is my name? 
o John 
o Patrice 
o James 
o Caries 
Submit I 
Fig 43, challenge step of SPAC 
Mujtaba was unable to answer these questions. He made a rough guess and received the 
message shown in Figure 44: 
103 
The infonnation provided is not 
correct. Please try again 
Fig 44, message for providing incorrect information 
He tried three false attempts and then he was locked out for a certain amount of time (in 
this case for I minute). Also on every new attempt the sequence of the questions and their 
possible answers change. For example in the second attempt he received the questions 
and their possible answers shown in Figure 45: 
1lifh at is my n a me? 
o James 
o Carlos 
o John 
o Patrice 
'll/hat is my country name? 
o UK 
o France 
o Germany 
o Spain 
'lolhat is my profession? 
o Driving 
o Management 
o Academics 
o Business 
V'.fhat is. my organisation? 
OPERA 
o ESPRC 
o DERA 
o ERA 
Submit 
Fig 45, challenge step's questions and multiple choices with changed sequence 
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In a second test we tried to spam a user with ID Abeera and we obtained the same results. 
We perfonned 100 such tests and obtained a false negative in only 2 tests. For 4 questions 
(with 4 multiple choice answers to each questions) about a recipient, the probability of 
getting an access code by guessing all the answers correctly would be 0.0039 (11256) and 
a probability of 0.00097 (1/1024) for 5 questions. Again remember that due to the lock 
out mechanism a spammer cannot make more than 3 false attempts for a particular 
recipient. This means that the spammer could deliver spam at the cost of effort and time 
which is not acceptable in the spamming business. The beauty of the SP AC mechanism is 
that it prevents spam and if a spammer does get through (in negligible cases) then it 
provides such an unpleasant infrastructure eRvironment for the spammer that he gives up 
and goes away with no profit. Another interesting thing that we would like to mention 
here is that we asked a number of participants to act as spammers (including the 
colleagues in my research lab). While acting as spammers all of them showed their 
impatience with the SPAC mechanism. Their general expression was, "we will not be 
able to succeed then why are you asking to try it (or so many users". Their expression 
while acting as a spammer in the presence of SPAC mechanism reveals that the SPAC 
mechanism is very unpleasant for spammers. This also supports the findings of 
Mail Channels (fact iv, section 4.2) that spammers are impatient and they abort the 
connection if they can not deliver a message within several seconds. 
SPAC treated sybiJ attacks, dictionary attacks and address spoofing the same way 
because in each case the system function as for unknown persons. The sender had to pass 
through the CAPTCHA procedure, challenge mechanism and charging mechanism. 
Blocked spammers 
Persons with addresses in the BPL (Blocked Persons lists) list of a recipient are blocked 
spammers for that recipient. Figure 46 shows the welcome window of Prof. Parish and 
the persons in his BPL list. 
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TPL (Trusted Person's List) 
" Yaqoob (22334455) ... [01 
Ray (ray) ,1tr. [0] 
Khslil (09123455) .&. [e) 
BPL (Blocked Person's List) 
Eve (8\'2) ,1tr. [cl 
Sarmad (sarmad) .1tr. [0] 
Ydsir (0208123455).~ [01 
NPL (New Person's List) 
(02084321).~ [Cl 
(0112345) ,~ [0] 
C .. UI Send 
Click hN8 
Fig 46, The different lists in the welcome window 
We perfonned 100 tests where persons in the BPL list of a recipient failed to send spam 
to the recipient. SPAC didn't show any false negative for these tests. For example in the 
very first such test when the spammer with ID sannad wanted to send spam to Prof. 
Parish, he received the message shown in Figure 47. 
http://localhost/spac/sendmsg . php ?org_uid=32&&J1ame=&&s i 
Sorry, you can not access the recipient 
[Xl Close Window 
Fig 47, Error message received by a spammer 
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Simulated bots (Auto-spam) 
The 20 participants in our test also tested the efficiency of the SP AC mechanism against 
bots whereby the users were asked to click on a link given on the SP AC home page. After 
clicking on the link the application selected usemames (IDs) from a list in order to send 
messages to the recipients with the selected IDs. After clicking the auto-spam test link on 
the SP AC home page, CAPTCHA procedures codes were introduced to differentiate 
between a human spammer and auto generated spam machine. This is the first step for 
obtainingAC code of the SPAC mechanism. This is shown in Figure 48. 
t:semame 
El Enter t!>.e text given in the image Mlt~ 
El Enter the text given in the image "N~\~ 
El Enter the text given in the image ~ 
El Enter the text given in the image ~ 
El Enter the text giren in the image 8mt\\fl 
El Enter the text giren in dle image ~ 
RI IhO$$ain Enter the text given in dle image VJW{ 
RI Ikhalil Enter the text giren in dle image ~ 
Fig 48, CAPTCHA codes to stop bots 
Apart from the CAPTCHA codes in the first step, SPAC provides the possible answers 
and the Access code in the form of distorted text which make it more immune to bots. 
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Keeping in view the fact that modem computers can not bypass the CAPTCHA 
procedures, the auto-spam tests failed. 
Table 2 summarises the results obtained from different tests on the SP AC application. 
Table 2, results obtained from tests on the SPAC application 
These results show some interesting facts about the SPAC mechanism which are as 
follows: 
• SPAC doesn't show any false positive (A very interesting and important feature of 
SPAC) 
• No introduction problem for new contacts 
• An overall efficiency of 99.8% 
• No impact on the distribution oflegitimate messages (no false positive) 
• The performance of SPAC is not affected by sybil attacks, dictionary attacks and 
address spoofing which are the common types of attacks used by spammers. In fact, 
SP AC functions as for unknown persons for all these sorts of attacks. 
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Figure 49 shows a graph of the performance of the SP AC application against spam 
messages. 
Spam Messages 
2.5,---------------, 
Xl 2 Cl .~~----------------------------------------------------
~ 1.5 I C Delivered I 
~ 1 
.<!: 0.5 
a 0 -I-...Ll!LCl2I.---,,...--__ -..,-___ -! 
100 100 700 
Stranger Blocked Sirrulated Bots 
Spamrers 
Sender Type/Technique 
Fig 49, graph showing the performance of SPAC against spam messages 
The graph shows that only two out of the 900 spam messages were classified as false 
negatives. 
6.4 Third party application (E-commerce websites) 
The initial results dug out that there can be some concerns in cases where a person wants 
to purchase or sell a certain item e.g. a laptop. In such a case the interested customers 
mayor may not be strangers but are stilI legitimate users. For this we proposed the 
concept of multiple access codes. Apart from the master access code (also called the 
primary access code), SPAC offers two other child access codes. We performed 100 such 
tests in which the sender wanted to sell or purchase something from some e-commerce 
website such as e-bay. 
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We could not of course put our fake requests (for testing purposes) for sale or purchase 
on the real e-bay website or similar. So, we created a simulation of such a web site in the 
SPAC application. The third option, "Third Party Application" on the SPAC home page 
was used for this purpose. The user can click on it and can post his message along with 
his child access code. The "View Request" link on the SPAC home page is the analogy of 
a webpage open to users for viewing posts by different users. A sample snapshot is given 
in Figure 50: 
1 User ID i Access Code I Message 
123456 176543 I Hello, P4 Laptop (with one year warranty) for sale. 
123456 r 87654 I NokiaN95 wanted. E~pectedrange £300 to £350. 
r87-878787T89898-~--II~~t t~'~ll m;B~f\~;-;;~f~r £5000~---------
Iki~~~--~]8~~8c8-=-='li\;'~~~iik~~~~~~;;~1~~ f~;£400~==~~~=' 
Fig 50, snapshot of the simulation of e-commerce website 
Note that the secondary access code of the user with ID "2345" (ID of David) is 76543. 
All the viewers (interested in buying David's laptop) can send David a message by using 
his username (ID) and his secondary access code (a temporary access code). David will 
not change this temporary access code until he doesn't want to receive messages 
(regarding his laptop) from all strangers. In this interval even a spammer would be able to 
send him a spam message. This is a limitation of the SP AC mechanism. David changes 
his access code after he has sold his laptop. This means that even if David displays his 
secondary access code for a short time (until he sells his laptop) and the spammers obtain 
his secondary access code, it will not benefit the spammer because sparnming in such a 
small amount will not profit the spammer as discussed in detail in chapter 4. 
6.5 Summary 
The performance of the SPAC application has been evaluated by performing different 
tests on the SPAC application. The results obtained from the SPAC application verifies 
that the SP AC mechanism is targeting spam from two angles i.e. preventing spam and 
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discouraging spammers. The overall efficiency of the SPAC mechanism was 99.8% with 
no false positives. Those who were testing it found it so frustrating to spam. This shows 
that someone who is spamming for money would found it more frustrating. The tests 
show that SPAC has no impact on the distribution of legitimate messages. At the same 
time it prevents spam and makes the infrastructure environment so unpleasant for the 
spanuners that they give up. In fact SPAC makes the spamming business non-profitable 
for the spammers because it wastes a lot of their time, resources, effort and money. SPAC 
treats sybil attacks, dictionary attacks and address spoofing the same way. SPAC 
functions as for unknown persons for these sorts of attacks. Based on the results obtained 
from the various tests on the SP AC application, the SP AC mechanism shows better 
performance than the existing anti-spam techniques. 
III 
7 Performance Comparison 
7.1 Introduction 
In addition to the idea of Access Code, SPAC uses a combination of technological anti-
spam measures. The difference is that SP AC uses those techniques in a different way and 
combines them in a unique way which enables SPAC to acquire the good features of a 
number of technological anti-spam approaches without showing the drawbacks of these 
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approaches. This chapter compares the performance of SPAC with existing technological 
anti-spam approaches. 
7.2 Comparison with the state-of-the-art anti-spam 
technological approaches 
Detailed descriptions of the working and drawbacks of state-of-the-art technological anti-
spam techniques have been discussed in chapter 3. In order to have a better understanding 
of the comparison, we will review the drawbacks of state-of-the-art techniques and 
compare the performance ofSPAC with these technologies. 
7.2.1 Payment 
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The payment mechanism is based on charging the sender of an email with a small 
payment. The idea is to keep the payment so small that it remains negligible for a 
legitimate user but potentially high for the spammers. However as discussed in section 
3.5.1 (chapter 3) this is a difficult trade off and the implementation of such a payment 
infrastructure can be an ambitious endeavour [40]. 
There is a lot of risk involved in this mechanism especially in the presence of address 
spoofing and zombies. Also these payment mechanisms are subject to false praise and 
create a significant problem in delivering legitimate/solicited bulk emails. The 
mechanism introduced by the "Penny Black Project" can cause loss to legitimate users in 
the presence of bots and zombies. The proposers of the Zmail protocol (discussed in 
section 3.5.1) concluded in [58] that there remain numerous questions about all the 
payment mechanisms and deployment of the service raises several tricky issues. In all 
cases, deployment is difficult. In addition the email and VoIP users are reluctant to pay 
anything extra for emails and VoIP services. The payment approach is against the open 
flavour of Internet and is expected to punish legitimate users for the misbehaviours of 
others. 
The charging mechanism provided by SP AC doesn't charge any money, rather it provides 
free tokens on regular intervals (say on per month basis). This is not in contradiction with 
the 'open flavour of the Internet. Also this mechanism doesn't charge for each message. 
Rather it charges only for accessing the access code from the server and returns the token 
when the recipient doesn't declare the caller/sender, a spammer. Each message of a 
spammer is to a new or stranger recipient so a spammer will be charged a token for each 
message. In contrast very few (nearly negligible) messages of legitimate persons are to 
strangers. Based on the average number of messages to new persons or strangers per 
month (in our informal survey) we fixed the number of free tokens for the legitimate 
users (for our tests and experiments). Fixing the number of free tokens for each user 
becomes easy as compared to the difficult trade off in the existing payment mechanisms. 
All the drawbacks of the existing charging mechanisms are directly or indirectly related 
to: sybil attacks, address spoofing and the fact that money is involved in it. As discussed 
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in section 4.7 that these factors cannot affect the perfonnance of the SPAC mechanism. 
This enables SP AC to overcome the drawbacks of the existing payment mechanisms. 
The payment mechanism in SPAC doesn't involve money so there remains no issue of 
tricks and money theft as associated with the existing payment mechanisms. At the same 
time, the charging mechanism in SPAC is not affected by these attacks. In other words 
the charging mechanism in SPAC doesn't show the drawbacks of the existing payment 
mechanisms. The tokens are given to each user on per week (or per month) basis so loss 
of a few tokens (in any case) would not affect the user. 
A user can use his account even if he has no tokens in his account. The only limitation is 
that a user would not be able to obtain the access code from the server if he/she doesn't 
have the AC in his accounts. Recharging of tokens can also be requested from a server by 
providing infonnation about the account including password and Access code. 
7.2.2 White and black lists 
Our mechanism uses a modified fonn of this technique in the fonn of TPL and BPL lists. 
The state-of-the-art white and black lists maintain IPs, URLs or DNS names of the 
legitimate users and the spammers respectively and they are treated globally. The TPL 
list and BPL list are similar to the white and black lists in the sense that they maintain 
addresses of legitimate users and spammers respectively. However, instead of comparing 
the sender's ID with a global database, SPAC compares the sender's ID with the 
recipient's database only which is very small (nearly negligible) as compared to the 
global database used by the state-of-the-art white and black lists. This not only reduces 
processing load on the server and the wastage of precious resources but also results in a 
more efficient mechanism. If we assume that XYZ is a URL, IP or DNS which is in the 
current white list then it will be legitimate for all the users of the ESP and vice versa. This 
is a drawback because XYZ may be legitimate (approved) for a certain recipient whereas 
XYZ may !lot be trusted/approved for some other recipient. Due to this reason such white 
and black lists are subjected to false praise. In addition, spoofing addresses in the white 
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lists is not only easy for spamrners but also of interest for them because the spamrners 
know that they would be able to deliver the message using the spoofed addresses in the 
white lists. However, the TPL and BPL lists in our case are relevant to each individual 
separately. So, a person (say John) may be in the TPL list of a user (say ABC) but it is 
impossible that John would be in the TPL list of all the users. So, if a spamrner wants to 
use the spoofed address of John for spamming, it would not benefit him because John is 
not in the TPL list of other recipients. Also the spammer doesn't know the usemarnes of 
those accounts which contain John in their TPL lists. Even if the spammer has certain 
knowledge (which is of course impossible) then he would be able to send sparn only to a 
few persons, in which case spamming is not profitable. This feature of treating the TPL 
list and the BPL list of each person separately makes SPAC effective against false praise 
and address spoofing which are amongst the major limitations of state-of-the-art white 
and black lists as discussed in section 3.5.2. Apart from that, one ofthe major drawbacks 
of white and black lists is the introduction problem of the legitimate strangers (or first 
time callers/senders). With the ability to obtain access code from the server, SPAC 
overcomes this problem. 
Since the spammers keep on changing their identities and addresses, the existing white 
and black lists also show some issues regarding updating the lists. For example in case of 
sybil attacks a spammer changes his identity and this needs the black lists to be updated. 
On the other hand the spamrners use false praise techniques to put their addresses in the 
white lists which creates the need to update these lists as well. SPAC has no such 
problem because in this mechanism, the TPL and BPL lists are updated by the users 
individually and these are not maintained by the organisations or ISPs nor are they done 
publicly. So, this eliminates the possibility of false praise which in turn overcomes the 
chances of false positives or false negatives). Also SPAC doesn't show any introduction 
problem. Furthermore, the use of the NPL (as a 3rd list) adds to the convenience of the 
legitimate users as discussed in section 4.4.3. 
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7.2.3 Greylisting 
In Greylisting, the Greylisting email server looks for the triplets of the sender. This triplet 
can be of any legitimate user. A spammer can deliver a spam by spoofing the triplet of 
any legitimate user. However, spoofing doesn't help the spammer in SP AC as discussed 
previously. 
Spammers bypass the Greylisting mechanism by using software packages that retry 
delivery to other MX hosts for a domain if delivery through one MX fails. In such a 
scenario the purpose of Greylisting fails. Our mechanism also bears the call back feature 
of Greylisting but it is only in cases where a caller/sender is new to the recipients account 
and the spammers cannot bypass the SP AC mechanism because information about each 
recipient is different and unknown to the spammers. In such a case, for every new 
message the caller/sender is called back by the server by providing him with the 
challenge mechanism. 
Greylisting can also result in false positive in cases where an email never passes the 
triplet rule (for example in cases where the IP address of a host changes). In most of the 
cases, the sending and receiving clients are unaware of the failure of the delivery. The 
results discussed in chapter 6 show that SPAC doesn't show any false positive. 
Considering the fact as discussed previously that the spam traffic is 4 to 5 times more 
than the legitimate email traffic, Greylisting results in an increase of email traffic because 
most of the emailswillberesent.This also leads to the conclusion that this technique 
does not take into account the network resources' abuse. In addition the users may 
experience unwanted delays due to congestion on the network which results due to the 
huge amount of resent emails. As opposed to it, SP AC functions as a standard email 
process for majority of the cases. It calls back a user only in cases where a sender/caller 
wants to obtain access code from the server. In fact SPAC takes into account the network 
resources' abuse because this mechanism prevents spam on the connection establishment 
phase. That is before spam traffic (message or information data) accesses the network, a 
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sender needs to pass the SP AC mechanism which is not possible for the spammers. As 
opposed to Greylisting, SPAC doesn't create delay due to congestion. 
7.2.4 Challenge/response 
It is discussed in section 3.5.4 that the challenge/response mechanism provides 
inconvenience to the users. The reason is that that the distorted text or the enriched (with 
noise or music) audio signal should not be too cluttered to be understood by a legitimate 
user. Especially in the case of VoIP the problem of different accents and different 
languages can complicate the communication process and it would be very difficult for a 
caller to understand the noise enriched audio voice. At the same time if it is made too 
easy then the intelligent recognition software used by spamn1ers could identify the letters 
and numbers (in the distorted text) or voice (in case ofVoIP). 
Instead of providing the caller/sender with random distorted text in images as for 
CAPTCHA, SP AC asks information about the recipient in the form of distorted text. 
Since the sender/caller knows the information about the recipient so introduction of noise 
in voice or distorted text will not create a problem for the user and the relevant text can 
easily be identified. We can increase the noise level in the case of SPAC to make it more 
cluttered. This can be achieved by introducing CAPTCHA procedures at the challenge 
step (i.e. questions and answers). The distorted text and the noise enriched audio signal is 
not a problem in this case. The reason is that in the case of SPAC, the caller/sender 
already has information about the answers of the questions provided to the sender/caller 
by the SP AC mechanism. The multiple answers to different questions are provided to the 
user in the form of distorted text and/or noise enriched signals. If a user has advance 
information about the actual answers then it means that the words or answers would not 
be totally random for the legitimate sender/caller but it would be totally random for a 
spammer because the spammer doesn't have any such information about the recipient. 
The final access code is also given to the user in distorted form in an image. 
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Apart from bots, challenge/response mechanisms like CAPTCHA can not prevent other 
forms of spam especially those where the spammers send spam manually to a large 
number of recipients. The spammers take benefit of this weakness of the CAPTCHA 
procedures and overcome it by using social engineering attacks as discussed in section 
3.5.4. In the case of SPAC it would not be possible for a spammer or a third party (like 
pom web site viewer) to pass the challenge phase on behalf of the spammer. 
State-of-the-art challenge/response mechanisms also complicate the sending of solicited 
bulk messages (like newsletter) which will become impossible or costly in the presence 
of challenges. This is because each challenge will need a human resource. SPAC doesn't 
show such problems because the sender doesn't need to pass through the SPAC 
mechanism for persons who are already in the TPL list which are the majority of cases in 
case of SP AC. It means that SP AC has all the good features of CAPTCHA but 
overcomes its drawbacks by providing an access code mechanism which can not be 
bypassed even by spammers (or third party like pom websites viewers) due to the lack of 
information about the recipient. 
7.2.5 Cryptographic puzzles 
In the presence ofbots, the idea of Cryptographic puzzles not only fails but also causes a 
significant loss of resources to legitimate users. At the same time with such an approach, 
a legitimate user with a slow machine can experience unacceptable delays due to the 
meaningless challenges. SPAC doesn't show the negative responses to the cryptographic 
puzzles because address spoofing, sybil attacks and/or gaining unlimited computational 
power of innocent users will not heIp the spammer in overcoming the challenge steps of 
information and CAPTCHA. Above all the use of tokens for an account will limit the use 
of a certain account used by spammers for sending spams. 
7.2.6 Reputation Mechanisms 
As discussed in section 3.5.6, reputation mechanisms are susceptible to false praise and 
they don't provide any protection against address spoofing. For these reasons such 
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mechanisms can result both in false positives and false negatives. Such mechanisms can 
also cause significant loss to innocent users. As opposed to these mechanisms, SP AC 
provides the ability for users to declare the reputation of each of their contact persons 
individually and locally. Therefore the control is with the users and this overcomes the 
problem of false praise because a user will not classify a trusted person as a spammer in 
his database otherwise he will loose contact with that person. At the same time the good 
or bad praise (classifying legitimate or spammer respectively) about a sender/caller by a 
certain user doesn't affect the sender's status for other users. That is the reputation in the 
case of SPAC is not global rather it is local. Reputation systems are also ineffective 
against Sybil attacks where as SPAC doesn't show any inefficiency in the case of Sybil 
attacks. 
7.2.7 Content Filtering 
Since content filtering is the most popular and widely deployed anti-spam mechanism so 
we will compare our proposed SPAC mechanism in detail with the state-of-the-art 
content filtering mechanism. As mentioned by Enrico Blanzieri and Anton Bryl [13], 
filtering solves the problems caused by spam only partially which prevents end-users 
from wasting their time on junk messages. But it should be noticed that since all the 
messages are delivered nevertheless, this mechanism does not prevent resource misuse. 
Apart from the resource misuse the statement by Encrico Blanzieri and Anton Bryl shows 
that filtering mechanisms are unable to solve the problem of spam to an acceptable level. 
The probabilistic nature of the content filtering techniques also encourages the sparnmers 
to send a large amount of messages so as to increase the percentage of their delivered 
messages and benefit from the spamrning. business. This means that content filtering 
techniques do not help in preventing the abuse of network/Internet resources. Since 
SP AC filters spam at the connection phase, spam messages do not access the network 
resources and are not even given a connection. 
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Content filtering mechanisms also waste huge amount of resources on processing while 
checking the contents of the message: Since SPAC doesn't work on content filtering, it 
doesn't show such drawbacks. 
Many filtering research works claim that the accuracy of their filtering algorithms 
(obtained from the experimental evaluation of their algorithms) is above 90%. However 
the experimental evaluation of these filtering algorithms can not show the exact real 
behaviour or efficiency of these algorithms. The reason is that all these experiments (and 
hence their results) are based on empirical testing and their data sets are small as 
compared to the global spam data. These results don't take into account all the techniques 
used by spammers to evade these filters. At the same time their data sets may not be up to 
date. Also filter-based approaches use different definitions of spam. Due to these reasons 
we believe that in practice the actual accuracy of these filtering algorithms is less than 
what the results of the empirical tests show (mostly 90%). At the same time all these 
filtering algorithms show a considerable amount of false positives. As opposed to this, the 
results obtained from our different tests on the SPAC mechanism (discussed in chapter 6) 
show that the accuracy of the SPAC mechanism is 99.8%. In addition, SPAC provides 
such an unpleasant infrastructure environment for the sparnmer that the spamming 
business becomes non-profitable for him. This shows a clear edge of SP AC over the 
currently most widely deployed anti-spam filtering techniques. 
Another edge of SPAC over filter-based approaches is that SPAC doesn't show any false 
positives (where a ham message is classified as spam). All the filter-based approaches 
show false positives which are potentially very costly for individuals, companies and 
organisations. Currently there is no filtering mechanism that can give 100% accurate 
results (Le. to find an accurate and precise difference between legitimate and spam 
messages) and in fact we do not think that such a filtering mechanism is possible due to 
the lack of a single technical definition of spam (which can be used by filters) and for the 
reasons given below. 
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State-of-the-art filtering mechanisms are also costly in tenns of maintenance and training 
the IT staff on using these filters. Configuring the paramteres of the spam filters for a 
trade off between false positives and false negatives is one of the most difficult aspects of 
the filtering mechanisms. That is to set some lineant parameters in spam filters which will 
stop a good percentage of spam emails but still allowing annoying amounts of spam in 
order to get ensure a certain level of probability that legitimate emails are not filtered out. 
Since SPAC doesn't depend on the contents of the message so it doesn't show any 
drawbacks related to the lack of a single technical definition of spam and/or the cost of IT 
training and maintenance. 
Another unique feature of the performance of the SP AC mechanism is that it creates a 
distinction about the two types of users; those who like to receive advertising messages 
and those who do not like to receive such messages. This is achieved by providing a 
feature for disabling or enabling the SPAC mechanism. In the case of disabling SPAC, 
the standard operation of email will work and the recipient will receive all messages. This 
allows the email advertisers to advertise their messages in the best possible way without 
any regard to evade spam filters. This will reduce the legal issues associated with 
advertising emails and will increase the return on investment for the advertising 
companies. SPAC clearly informs the sender about any recipient who has disabled SPAC 
and who would like to receive advertising emails.This also reduces traffic on the 
Internet. The reason is that with the current filtering techniques, in order to increase the 
number of positive responses from the recipient, spammers send large amounts of email 
because they know that only a small percentage of it will respond or will be interested in 
the advertisement. 
Another benefit of SPAC is that it gives convenience to the users by making them free of 
all the opt-in and opt-out mechanisms of different companies and organisations. In opt-in 
and opt-out mechanisms, the control is in the hands of advertising companies (email 
senders). The email advertising companies are very large in number. So, in these 
mechanisms it becomes very difficult for the users to understand all the opt-out 
mechanisms especially as spam messages are more than four times ham messages and 
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when the senders are not from reputed organisations. However, SPAC transfers this 
control to the users who can enable and disable reception or rejection of advertising 
emails by an action as simple as a click of mouse. 
7.3 Summary 
State-of-the-art techniques show a number of negative impacts. Comparison of the 
performance of SPAC with existing technological anti-spam approaches reveals that 
SP AC bears the good features of these techniques without showing any drawbacks. It 
gives better results than the current filtering techniques in which sometimes the filters 
filter out legitimate messages. The comparison shows that SP AC has a clear edge over 
the existing anti-spam techniques. As compared to other technological approaches, SPAC 
needs less management and reduces the need for IT staff. It also prevents the network 
resources misuse. 
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8 Conclusion 
8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis has addressed the spam problem and has developed an anti-spam mechanism 
known as SPAC (Spam Prevention using Access Codes). The thesis has discussed the 
losses caused by spam which were underestimated for many years and has showed that 
state-of-the~art anti-spam techniques, policies or training have helped the Internet from 
collapsing due to spam but they likely to have very limited positive impact. None of the 
existing anti-spam solutions can prevent sufficient spam to be considered a solution for 
the spam problem. The losses caused by spam are worth billions of dollars per annum and 
the growth rate of spam is increasing every year. The thesis found that there is a strong 
desire for an efficient anti-spam mechanism that can stop sufficient amounts of spam with 
no negative impact on the distribution oflegitimate messages. This research has proposed 
and evaluated the SPAC (Spam Prevention using Access Codes) mechanism which uses 
AC codes to prevent spam and to combine various anti-spam approaches. There are many 
contributions of the thesis including the use of Access Codes for preventing spam and for 
combining some of the popular anti-spam mechanisms to achieve better results, no 
impact on the distribution of legitimate messages, ability of SPAC to prevent spam in its 
various forms (voice, audio, text and image), prevention of the consumption of precious 
network resources and the little or no effect of the different types of spam attacks 
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(including address spoofing attacks, sybil attacks, dictionary attacks and bots) on SPAC. 
This work found a limitation of the charging mechanismofSPAC which can work only if 
a global charge structure is introduced. However, this limitation does not affect the 
overall performance of the SPAC mechanism. The results obtained from the tests on the 
SPAC application reveal that the objectives as mentioned in section 4.1 have been 
achieved by the SPAC mechanism. These tests show that SPAC is very unpleasant for 
spammers. It wastes a lot of their time, resources, effort and money. SPAC doesn't show 
any false positives. Apart from spam email and SPIT, SPAC can be used to prevent spam 
in other applications as well such as cellular telephony, traditional telephony and instant 
messaging services. It gives better results than the current filtering techniques in which 
sometimes the filters filter out legitimate messages and in most of the cases neither the 
recipient nor the sender knows that the message has been filtered or blocked. Detailed 
analysis of the results obtained from the tests on the SPAC application (as discussed in 
chapter 6) and study of the characteristics of the spammer and a legitimate user show that 
the challenge and charging mechanisms provided by SP AC are very difficult, unpleasant 
and costly for the spammer. As compared to other technological approaches, SP AC needs 
less management and reduces the need for IT staff and saves the network's resources 
misuse. SP AC provides the user with a degree of convenience because legitimate trusted 
users (which are the majority of the cases for accounts ofiegitimate recipients) will not 
need the AC code and provides them with a better alternative to the opt-out mechanism. 
The overall performance of SP AC is better than the existing anti-spam techniques. 
8.2 Areas of Application 
The beauty of the SP AC mechanism is that it prevents spam on the connection 
establishment phase. After the connection is established, no processing is done on the 
contents of the message. So, there is no issue of SP AC related to the QoS of various 
technologies like VoIP. Because of this reason~ SPAC is applicable to a number of other 
technologies such as cellular telephony, traditional telephony and instant messaging 
service. In all these technologies, SP AC prevents spam on the connection establishment 
phase which involves text data in the connection establishment phase. 
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8.3 Future Work 
We will continue to explore interesting features and properties of the SPAC mechanism. 
Future research would include fixing the number of free tokens. This would require 
collaboration from some reputed ESP or VoIP service provider. The reason is that they 
already have the records of all the values that are needed for fixing the number of these 
tokens. Specifically we will be interested in information regarding the average number of 
new contacts per month that each user makes. We would also look into improving the 
database structure for the SP AC mechanism. This part will focus on developing a 
database mechanism which generates automatic questions based on the information given 
by the user at the time of registration and will also suggest the answers for those 
questions. 
In case of successful implementation of spam where it would be difficult or non-
profitable to send spam, the spammers might attempt to hack the server or the user 
account with the aim of accessing the TPL list or tokens. In such a case the spammer 
would be able to send spam to the recipient by spoofing the IDs in their TPL list. 
However, the spammer would not be able to send spam in bulk because an ID in the TPL 
list of a person X is not necessary to be in the TPL lists of other users. Preventing the 
spammers from hacking the server or users' accounts is not a part of this research. 
However, our future work will also focus on making SP AC more immune to cases where 
a spammer accesses the TPL lists by hacking the server and/or users' accounts. 
The reduction in the number of tokens of a legitimate user (as a result of address 
spoofing) can show himlher that his address is being used illegitimately. Thus he would 
be able to take further actions. At the same time it can also help in research about address 
spoofing which is not a part of this research. When provided with a feedback mechanism, 
the owner of the account could contact the email service provider (ESP) about the 
illegitimate use of hislher account which will help the ESP in collecting information and 
data about such abuse. This data and information from the user would help in the research 
about address spoofing. Our future work would focus on designing a feedback 
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mechanism with a well-designed database that updates itself every time the user gives a 
feedback. The database would give a number of features/attributes of address spoofing 
and spoofers and would help in finding a way to overcome it. 
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Appendix A - Dreamweaver 
To create web pages easily we have used Macromedia Dreamweaver 8 as our visual 
editor. It can hide the details of the HTML code of pages from the user. This makes it 
easy for non-coders to create web pages and sites. 
With Dreamweaver (as discussed in [82]), users can preview websites in many browsers, 
provided they are installed on their computer. It has some site management tools 
including the ability to find and replace lines of text or code by whatever parameters 
specified across the entire site, and a templatization feature for creating multiple pages 
with similar structures. The behaviors panel in Dreamweaver enables use of basic 
J avaScript without any coding knowledge. 
With the use of "Extensions" - small programs in Dreamweaver, any web developer can 
write (usually in HTML and JavaScript). In addition, extensions provide added 
functionality to the software for whomever wants to download and install them. A large 
commmunity of extension developers support Dreamweaver who make extensions 
available (both commercial and free) for most web development tasks from simple 
rollover effects to full-featured shopping carts. 
Like other HTML editors, Dreamweaver edits files locally, then uploads all edited files to 
the remote web server using FTP, SFTP, or WebDAV. 
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Appendix B - PHP (Hypertext Preprocessor [83] 
PHP stands for "Hypertext Preprocessor" which is a widely-used Open Source general-
purpose scripting language that is especially suited for Web development and can be 
embedded into HTML. We have used PHP as our server technology to build web 
applications because PHP server technology is supported by Dreamweaver. Scripting or 
tag-based language to be used is selected based on the server technology available on the 
server. The most popular languages for the five server technologies supported by 
Dreamweaver are as follows: 
Server technology 
ColdFusion 
ASP.NET 
Active Server Pages (ASP) 
Java Server Pages (JSP) 
PHP 
Language 
ColdFusion Markup Language (CFML) 
Visual Basic 
C# 
VBScript 
JavaScript 
Java 
PHP 
Since we use PHP as our server technology so our scripting language for the SPAC 
application is PHP. PHP development is focused on server-side scripting. It means that 
the code is executed on the server. The client receives the results of running the script but 
no way of determining the underlying code. PHP can do anything that other COl program 
can do, such as collect form data, generate dynamic page content, or send and receive 
cookies. 
As described in [83], PHP scripts are used in three main areas: 
Server-side scripting 
This is the most traditional field for PHP and is used in our SP AC application. Three 
things are required to make this work. The PHP parser (CGI or server module), a web 
server and a web browser. We need to run the web server, with a connected PHP 
installation. The PHP program output can be accessed with a web browser, viewing the 
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PHP page through the server. All these can also run on a home machine for 
experimenting with PHP programming. 
Command line scripting 
You can make a PHP script to run it without any server or browser. You only need the 
PHP parser to use it this way. This type of usage is ideal for scripts regularly executed 
using cron (on *nix or Linux) or Task Scheduler (on Windows). These scripts can also be 
used for simple text processing tasks. 
Writing desktop applications 
PHP is not the very best language to create a desktop application with a graphical user 
interface but you can use some advanced PHP features in your client-side applications by 
using PHP-GTK to write such programs. You also have the ability to write cross-platform 
applications this way. PHP-GTK is an extension to PHP, not available in the main 
distribution. It greatly simplifies writing client-side cross platform GUI applications. 
PHP can be used on all major operating systems, including Microsoft Windows, Mac OS, 
Linux, many Unix variants (including HP-UX, Solaris and OpenBSD), RISC OS, and 
probably others. In addition, PHP has support for most of the web servers today. This 
includes Apache, Microsoft Internet Information Server, Personal Web Server, Netscape 
and iPlanet servers, Oreilly Website Pro server, Caudium, Xitami, OmniHTTPd, and 
many others. It means that with PHP, a user has the freedom of choosing an operating 
system and a web server. Furthermore, a user has the choice of using procedural 
programming or object oriented progrannning, or a mixture of them. Besides outputting 
HTML, PHP outputs include images, PDF files and even Flash movies (using libswf and 
Ming) generated on the fly. 
PHP can support a wide range of databases which is one of the strongest and most 
significant features in PHP. Writing a database-enabled web page is incredibly simple. 
Currently PHP supports the following databases: 
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Adabas D 
InterBase 
PostgreSQL 
dBase 
FrontBase 
SQLite 
Empress 
mSQL 
Solid 
FilePro (read-only) 
Direct MS-SQL 
Sybase 
Hyperwave 
MySQL 
Velocis . 
IBMDB2 
ODBC 
Unixdbm 
Informix 
Oracle (OCI7 and OCIS) 
Ingres 
Ovrimos 
PHP also uses a database abstraction extension (named PDO) allowing the users to 
transparently use any database supported by that extension. Additionally PHP supports 
ODBC, the Open Database Connection standard, so the user can connect to any other 
database supporting this world standard. 
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Appendix C - MySQL 
MySQL is one of the most popular Open Source SQL database management systems 
which is developed, distributed, and supported by MySQL AB. MySQL AB is a 
commercial company, founded by the MySQL developers. The essence about the 
importance and features of MySQL as taken from [84] are as follows: 
MySQL is a database management system 
A database is a structured collection of data. It may be anything from a simple shopping 
list to a picture gallery or the vast amounts of information in a corporate network. To add, 
access, and process data stored in a computer database, you need a database management 
system such as MySQL Server. Since computers are very good at handling large amounts 
of data, database management systems play a central role in computing, as standalone 
utilities, or as parts of other applications. 
MySQL is a relational database management system 
A relational database stores data in separate tables rather than putting all the data in one 
big storeroom. This adds speed and flexibility. The SQL part of "MySQL" stands for 
"Structured Query Language." SQL is the most common standardized language used to 
access databases and is defined by the ANSVISO SQL Standard. The SQL standard has 
been evolving since 1986 and several versions exist. "SQL-92" refers to the standard 
released in 1992, "SQL:1999" refers to the standard released in 1999, and "SQL:2003" 
refers to the current version of the standard. The phrase "the SQL standard" is used for 
the current version of the SQL Standard at any time. 
MySQL software is Open Source 
Open Source means that it is possible for anyone to use and modify the software. 
Anybody can download the MySQL software from the Internet and use it without paying 
anything. 
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The MySQL Database Server is very fast, reliable, and easy to use 
MySQL Server was originally developed to handle large databases much faster than 
existing solutions and has been successfully used in highly demanding production 
environments for several years. Although under constant development, MySQL Server 
today offers a rich and useful set of functions. Its connectivity, speed, and security make 
MySQL Server highly suited for accessing databases on the Internet. 
MySQL Server works in client/server or embedded systems 
The MySQL Database Software is a client/server system that consists of a multi-threaded 
SQL server that supports different backends, several different client programs and 
libraries, administrative tools, and a wide range of application programming interfaces 
(APIs). 
A large amount of contributed MySQL software is available 
It is very likely that your favorite application or language supports the MySQL Database 
Server. 
The official way to pronounce "MySQL" is "My Ess Que Ell" (not "my sequel"), but it 
can be pronounced as "my sequel" or in some other localized way. 
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